20th century military communications technology thesis

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20th century military communications technology thesis popular problem solving editing service ca

20th century military communications technology thesis

This article explores the changing relationship between war and the state in the western world since the end of the Second World War. Specifically, it analyses how that relationship evolved during and after the Cold War, and extrapolates from current trends to speculate what impact war will have on the future evolution of the state.

Our understanding of the connection between war and the state assumes that war played an instrumental role in the formation of the state in the early modern period. The synergistic relationship established at that time then blossomed over the next four centuries, during which both state and war grew exponentially. However, this expansion was checked by the declining incidence and scale of interstate war after , which eventually allowed new political and economic priorities to emerge that resulted in the reshaping of, and a changed role for, the state.

The article presents an alternative view of the war—state relationship in the post-Second World War era. It does not challenge the logic that the decline in war affected the war—state connection. Instead, it demonstrates how the complexity of war after led to a deep but more subtle interaction, which had a profound effect on war, the state and society in the western world.

While I do not challenge the premise that a range of factors played a role in shaping the connection between war and the state, the precise interaction and relative importance of these forces have altered over time, and this has caused the demands of war on the state to shift in significant ways. In the period under scrutiny in this article, I argue that the role of technology in war increased dramatically because of the nuclear revolution.

In this setting, technological development reduced the opportunities for war, but the arms race it generated also brought into being new technologies, and these facilitated new forms of conflict. These developments affected our understanding of war's character and its interaction with the state. Military history provides a rich literature on war and technology, but its focus has tended to be on the importance of technology in helping militaries win wars.

However, my aim is to turn this domain upside down and explore not just how the world has changed and continues to change war, but how the war—technology dynamic has changed the world, in what might be described as a form of positive feedback. To this end, I expand and build on the historical overview presented by William McNeill and Maurice Pearton of the financial and technical linkages forged between war and the state starting in the late nineteenth century. Most importantly, this construct allows the contemporary war—state relationship to be viewed through a different lens, one that sees a stronger, darker and more damaging connection than is generally recognized.

In addressing this issue, I have relied on the experiences of the United States and United Kingdom, as representative examples of western states, to support the propositions set out here. Most importantly, in both cases the state played a leading role in promoting defence research after ; technology was of central importance in their strategic frameworks, and continues to be so today.

Second, both states consciously exploited defence technology to promote wider economic prosperity. I recognize that attempts to look into the future carry a great deal of risk. I am aware of this risk and explain below how I have taken it into account. The only general point I would make here is that history also shows that, sometimes, military forecasting is successful. I have looked at these examples and drawn on their methodologies.

In sum, the central argument of this article is that, after , technology acted as a vital agent of change in the war—state relationship, and eventually the ripples of this change spread throughout society. To illustrate this point, you have only to look at the ubiquitous smartphone and the genesis of technologies produced by defence research that made it possible. This capability has in turn affected the conduct of war; and this has affected the state.

Thus the smartphone provides just one significant example of how technology and war are shaping the state and the world we live in. The article is divided into three parts. The first explores the war—state relationship and the factors that shaped it during the Cold War. It explains why technological innovation became so important in war, and how this imperative influenced both our understanding of war and the interaction between war and the state.

The second section examines why the imperative for technological innovation persisted, and why the war—state infrastructure survived in the post-Cold War era. Finally, the third section explores how current trends might influence the war—state relationship in the future. Clausewitz missed the importance of technology as a variable in his analysis of war.

The first was the impact of the Industrial Revolution. This period of sustained and rapid technological innovation eventually affected all areas of human activity, including war. Evidence of the increased pace in technological change can be seen from Schumpeter's economic analysis of capitalism and its relationship to technology. In his view, four long economic cycles in the Industrial Revolution led to ground-breaking changes in the mode of production in little more than a hundred years.

However, this situation slowly changed such that the demands for military technology eventually shaped the wider context in which it existed—which brings us to the second reason why the importance of technology increased. O'Neill demonstrates how the state began to assume a role as a sponsor of technological innovation in defence in the late nineteenth century as the military became increasingly interested in the exploitation of technology.

The demands of war also resulted in the state expanding into the provision of education and health care to ensure the population was fit to wage war. Even liberal Britain succumbed to this view of the state. The advent of the nuclear age precipitated a profound change in the organization and conduct of war.

Hables Gray asserts that marks the dividing line between modern war and the birth of what he terms post-modern war. This new strategic setting precipitated what Holsti described as the diversification of warfare; and this in turn resulted in a blurring of the line between peace and war as governments employed a range of means to achieve their policy goals below the threshold of general war.

Most importantly, the forms of war proliferated as new ways were devised to employ war as a political tool in a nuclear world. However, in examining the post war—state relationship in the West, we need to revise our understanding of war so that it extends beyond physical violence and bloodshed.

Russian military reflections on the Cold War reveal an interesting narrative that reinforces this expansion of war beyond its traditional domain. According to this analysis, the Soviet Union lost the Cold War because it was defeated by non-military means employed by its enemy that focused on psychological, political, information, social and economic attacks against the Soviet state.

Technology played a vital role in facilitating this process, for example via the communications revolution, which facilitated the waging of activities such as political warfare. However, the most salient aspect of the Cold War was the discourse of deterrence. Within this context, the rituals of war in terms of organizing, preparing and demonstrating an ability to fight nuclear war in the hope of deterring potential opponents and thereby preventing the possibility of war became substitutes for organized violence.

Small wars happened on the periphery of the US and Soviet geopolitical space, but in the core region, a different kind of cognitive and cultural violence emerged, which can be seen as a form of war. How, then, did technology fit into this new discourse of war? According to Buzan, because nuclear deterrence relied on anticipated weapons performance, it became sensitive to technical innovation, which meant the state had to respond to technological change by investing in defence research to maintain the credibility of its deterrent.

The role of the state was vital because it was the state that provided the critical financial resources required to take embryonic technologies and develop them at a speed unlikely to be matched by the civilian market. The end of the Cold War resulted in a significant fall in defence expenditure.

Equally importantly, the state reduced its participation in sustaining defence research and allowed the private sector to play a more prominent role in defence production. In the UK, where the nationalized defence industries had already been privatized in the s, this process was extended to include the sale of the state's defence research and development arm. This change in industrial and technological policy reflected a broader adjustment as the state lost its position in the vanguard of the technological revolution.

Since the start of the Cold War, US government-funded defence research had given rise to technologies such as the internet, virtual reality, jet travel, data joining, closed-circuit TV, global positioning, rocketry, remote control, microwaves, radar, global positioning, networked computers, wireless communications and satellite surveillance. The critical difference between innovation in the defence market and its civilian counterpart was that, in the latter, high rates of consumption led to product and process innovation by companies.

As a result, civil technology providers increasingly took the lead in the information revolution. Given this new dynamism, military power relied increasingly on the existing pool of technological knowledge within the broader economy. The increasing emphasis on quality in war also generated greater complexity during operations. This trend facilitated the rise of private military companies in the post-Cold War era and resulted in western states increasingly subcontracting the provision of internal and external security to the private sector.

However, in spite of the end of the Cold War, western governments continued to have an appetite for technological innovation and its integration into ever more complex weapons. Indeed, an important feature of post-modern war was that machines assumed an unprecedented importance in the post-Cold War era.

In postmodern war, the central role of human bodies in war is being eclipsed rhetorically by the growing importance of machines. The First Gulf War was an important marker because it revealed to western society the power of technology, at least in a conventional war. As Freedman observed, this conflict resolved the high-tech versus low-tech debate which had persisted throughout the Cold War. Technology allowed western states to engage targets at long range with high accuracy, but at no risk to those firing the weapons—something that became very useful in an era of wars of choice.

Technological innovation in the techniques of war allowed the state to continue using force as an instrument of policy, especially in those instances where there was no clear political consensus on taking military action. The idea of an MIC persists today. For example, David Keen points to the powerful economic functions fulfilled by the war on terror, which he believed explained the persistence of a war based on counterproductive strategy and tactics.

During this period technology was viewed almost as a silver bullet. As such, it provided a neat answer to complex questions posed by the human and physical terrain of war. Most importantly, for a brief moment at least, it allowed western states to reimagine decisive victories and tidy peace settlements. How, then, will predicted developments in technology shape the future of war and the state?

This is a question that is causing much anxiety in both academic and policy-making circles. As Freedman points out, the future is based on decisions that have yet to be made in circumstances that remain unclear to those looking into a crystal ball. Cohen has pointed out that debates on the future of war often suffer from being technologically sanitized, ignoring politics and therefore lacking a meaningful context.

I address these problems in two ways. The first is to follow the advice offered by the sociologist Michael Mann, who observed that no one could accurately predict the future of large-scale power structures like the state; the most one can do is provide alternative scenarios of what might happen given different conditions, and in some cases to arrange them in order of probability. To this end, I adopt here the Clausewitzian framework of analysis which Colin Gray employed in considering future war.

As he explains:. Both avenues must be travelled here. Future warfare viewed as grammar requires us to probe probable and possible developments in military science, with reference to how war actually could be waged.

From the perspective of policy logic we need to explore official motivations to fight. In exploring the future relationship between war and the state, and the role played by technology, two possible visions are presented here. The first explores the continuation of the status quo and represents the default setting of both the UK and US governments with regard to the future.

The second follows the recommendation offered by Paul Davis, who advised when selecting a scenario to choose a vision that challenges and provokes controversy and that breaks out of orthodox thinking. Both models have one thing in common: they will be influenced by what might be seen as the next wave of technological change.

This latest technical convulsion is illustrated by Schwab's idea of the fourth Industrial Revolution, which is a crude facsimile of Schumpeter's theory of long economic cycles. According to his definition, AI is merely the development of computer systems to perform tasks that generally need human intelligence, such as speech recognition, visual perception and decision-making. More recently, Max Tegmark has defined AI as a non-biological intelligence possessing the capability to accomplish any complex task at least as well as humans.

Digital technologies that have computer hardware, software and networks at their core are not new, but represent a break with the third Industrial Revolution because of the level of sophistication and integration within and between them. These technologies are transforming societies and the global economy. The fourth Industrial Revolution is not only about smart and connected machines and systems. It is linked with other areas of scientific innovation ranging from gene sequencing to nanotech and from renewables to computing.

It is the fusion of these technologies and their interaction across the physical, digital and biological domains that make the fourth Industrial Revolution fundamentally different from previous epochs. Emerging technologies and broad-based innovations are diffusing much more quickly and more widely than their predecessors, which continue to unfold in some parts of the world.

It took the spindle, the hallmark of the first Industrial Revolution, years to spread outside Europe; by contrast, the internet permeated the globe in less than a decade. What, then, does this mean for the relationship between war and the state? In this version of the future, the policy logic of war remains focused on the security of the state and concentrates on state-based threats. The principal causes of war can be identified in the anarchy of the international system.

In addition, the state continues to function effectively and to be able to extract the resources needed to maintain its legitimacy and territorial integrity. Within this context, the state still pursues the development of advanced technologies to defend against mostly state-based threats.

In this scenario, future war is imagined as a symmetrical contest between conventional forces on an increasingly automated battlefield. Within this space, humans will be augmented and in some instances replaced by AI and robots contending with increasingly lethal forms of weaponry.

In this vision of the future, the military's pursuit of the next technology follows a familiar pattern, and the risk and uncertainty involved continue to make state finance and policy support indispensable to defence research. The most recent example of this activity is the UK government's promise to share with British Aerospace the cost of funding the development of a technology demonstrator for the next generation of fighter aircraft.

Named Tempest, this fighter can operate either as a manned or as an unmanned aircraft; it will rely on AI and employ directed energy weapons. At the core of the Third Offset is the intention to exploit advances in machine autonomy, AI, quantum computing and enhanced digital communications to improve the man—machine interface in the future battlespace.

It is important to note that non-western states are also pursuing these policies. The outstanding example here is China. Its economic model, which is based on state-sponsored capitalism, is enabling it to work in a close partnership with privately owned Chinese tech firms to achieve a broad-based technological self-sufficiency in both commerce and defence.

These are semiconductors, quantum computing and AI. In this scenario, then, the state can harvest and refine a range of new technologies generated by the private rather than the public sector in a manner that preserves its monopoly on the use of force. At the same time, that monopoly is reinforced because of the complexity of these capabilities and the challenges posed in their use on operations, which require well-trained and professional forces.

Private military companies will persist, but their existence will rely on their ability to draw on this pool of trained personnel created by the state to populate their organizations, which means they will support, not challenge, the state's role as a provider of security. In the second scenario of the future, the policy logic of war reflects a darker, dystopian image of the relationship between war and the state. In this setting, conflict is a product of desperation caused by scarcity, which is occurring on a global scale.

Most importantly, the causes of war lie within states as well as between them. In this multifaceted crisis, technological change is weakening rather than strengthening the state and undermining its ability to cope with the tsunami of problems sweeping over it.

The debate over this view of the future policy logic of war began in with the publication of a hugely controversial book called The limits to growth. Its principal conclusion was that population growth would create an insatiable demand for goods, outstripping the finite resource base of the planet. Humanity's efforts to address this imbalance in demand and supply by increasing productivity would be self-defeating and cause a host of environmental problems.

In spite of the passage of time since its first appearance, this book set out themes that are explicitly linked to the spectrum of security issues we face today. There is a general assumption that the worst effects of these environmental trends will be for the most part experienced outside the western world. Even when western states are affected, it is assumed, rich countries will possess the financial means to weather this future storm.

However, a recent report by Laybourn-Langton and colleagues challenges this simplistic assumption and points to the social and economic harm being caused globally by current forms of human-induced environmental change. These authors also demonstrate that no region of the world will be untouched by this phenomenon, and use the UK as a case-study to illustrate the point.

In their view, the degradation of the environment will interact with existing political and economic trends to undermine the cohesion and internal stability of states across the globe. Current trends suggest that a potential environmental crisis might run in parallel with a possible economic crisis. Ironically, the source of this predicament lies in potential problems generated by the fourth Industrial Revolution.

Like the military, business is also fast approaching a time when machine intelligence can perform many of the functions hitherto carried out by humans in a range of occupations. As McAfee and Brynjolfson explain, innovation was hugely advantageous in those occupations which relied on physical labour, allowing new forms of economic activity and employment based on human cognitive abilities to develop.

As in the military domain, so in our economic and political affairs it is predicted that AI will precipitate a revolution. A PriceWaterhouseCooper report predicted that 38 per cent of all jobs in the United States are at high risk of automation by the early s. This depressing analysis is supported by the Bank of England's estimate that up to 15 million jobs are at risk in the UK from increasingly sophisticated robots, and that their loss will serve to widen the gap between rich and poor.

As in the past, those most affected by this change will be the economically least powerful sectors of society—the old, and unskilled and unorganized labour. Until now, the managerial and professional classes have been able to use their economic and political positions to protect themselves from the worst effects of such crises.

Any job that can be done via the application of pattern-searching algorithms will be vulnerable. This includes banking and finance, the law and even education. Daniela Russ has argued that humans need the personal touch in their day-to-day lives and that humans are therefore guaranteed to have a place in the job market.

In their investigation of the use of AI in the provision of psychological therapy, they found people preferred the treatment offered by the AI precisely because it was a machine and so they did not feel judged. The system can also be configured to fit people's preferences, creating a 3D computer-generated image that is comforting and reassuring.

A significant limitation of AI and machine technology is that currently they cannot replicate the dexterity of humans in handling delicate objects, and this does leave a role for humans in the workplace. However, scientists in California are looking at the use of AI and machine technology as a way of addressing the acute labour shortages experienced in the fruit-picking industry; this includes the development of machines capable of deciding which fruit is ripe for picking, and doing so in a way that does not damage the produce during picking, processing or distribution.

Given these developments, Harari's prediction for humans in the workplace is bleak. Further evidence to support the depressing scenario depicted here is provided by the former head of Google China, Dr Kai-Fu Lee, a man with decades of experience in the world of AI. Most importantly, the new jobs created by computers did not generate a massive number of jobs.

What then are the political and security implications of this profound economic change in terms of war and the state? According to Wolf, three factors might determine how well the state deals with these challenges: first, the speed and severity of the transformation we are about to experience; second, whether the problem is temporary or likely to endure; and third, whether the resources are available to the state to mitigate the worst effects of these changes.

In the past, western governments have deployed a range of policies to deal with recessions or, as in the s, scarcity of resources such as oil. However, these macroeconomic policy responses operated on the assumption that such crises were temporary, and that economic growth would resume and normality be restored quickly if the right measures were in place. It was not a baseless accusation. Upon their return from England, Mowrer fanned the flames of fifth column alarmism in a series of widely-published editorials which were also republished as the pamphlet Fifth Column Lessons for America.

A map [Fig. The locations presumably corresponded to the hundreds of unions, organizations, and obscure clubs listed on the reverse side, many linked to Germany, Italy, and Eastern Europe, as well as to black American political organizations. A tabloid newspaper Beware the Fifth Column similarly prescribed self-defence through geopolitical knowledge, reproducing a map from the New York Daily Mirror [Fig.

As Heffernan argues, spy stories reached a crescendo of collective hysteria after , with the more popular newspapers cynically abusing public anxiety to boost circulation figures. Lord Northcliffe's Daily Mail carried dozens of articles… emphasising the weakness of Britain's defences against enemy agents who were apparently operating at will amongst an unsuspecting British public, sketching coastlines and fortifications, perusing Ordnance Survey maps, and secretly preparing for invasion. Though no such institute existed, the American press amplified both claims, portraying German geopolitics as a 97 science for waging war, and psychology as a new weaponized field for propagandists.

One prominent example was his Conversations with Hitler, which is now widely believed to have been fabricated. The enemy people must be demoralized and ready to capitulate, before military action can even be thought of… Mental confusion, indecisiveness, panic, these are our weapons. Significantly, Mowrer and Donovan framed the threat of fifth columnism as specific to democratic government.

The US edition was ominously titled Voices of Destruction. However, the logic was clear: race and class struggles supported German psychological warfare objectives and could therefore could be understood not in terms of civil democracy, but in terms of war. This transformation of the democratic motive from connotations of problematical actuality to connotations of futurity also fits well with the logic of the military motive, which requires great modifications of democracy as an actuality but can retain democracy "substantially" by making these modifications in the name of democracy as a purpose.

And the disfranchised, such as the natives of India or the Negroes of the South, can logically be asked to defend democracy as a purpose — even when they could not be asked to defend it as an actuality. The logic was the culmination of the liberal panic over the vulnerability and manipulability of the public in the inter-war years Ch. Indeed, the geographical deracination of psychological warfare was fundamental to the threat that it could take hold anywhere. It seems mysterious. The immensity of this sum is the secret p.

Though it is difficult to ascertain the exact nature of the collaboration, Taylor was an asset of the British Security Coordination Mahl , which leveraged contacts in the American press — with the support of Donovan and President Roosevelt — to disseminate unattributed interventionist propaganda to the American public. Though largely forgotten, more than any other individual Edmond Taylor advanced claims concerning the existence and nature of psychological warfare that supported the interventionist position that the United States was under attack from an unseen German plot to control the minds of the American people.

Like bombing, I argue that the moral economy of psychological warfare revolves around the claims that it is objective, that it is manly, that it saves lives, and that it is law-ful. Central to the early construction of German psychological warfare was the claim that it was objective — not only a new and intractable reality of modern war, but guided by scientific expertise. See Lemov and Melley Second, it distanced psychological warfare from the propaganda of the First World War which two decades of inter-war debunking had shown to have been primarily a matter of duplicity and deception by the governing classes.

Against my analysis of the rootedness of the power of the press in the pastoral time-spaces of information circulation and audience commodification, psychological warfare rhetorically dislocated power from these spaces, posing psychological warfare not as a material problem open to political redress, but as an esoteric and technical problem of the human mind.

In their insistence upon the psychological and therefore the individuated, Taylor and his colleagues at the Office of the Coordinator of Information advanced an idealist theory of communication. Through shortwave broadcast, radio signals could be carried across oceans, and in theory an American listenership for German programming could be developed. Broadcasts attempted to counter interventionist claims, and to assure Americans that Germany had no military designs on the United States.

It was perhaps for good reason, however, that alarmists like Taylor and Donovan eschewed material analysis of German psychological warfare. Gillars served twelve years in the United States, while Joyce was hanged in England in , making him the last person executed for treason in the United Kingdom.

What sympathies with Germany did exist in the United States adhered to extant American anti-Semitism and white supremacy, like that of America First luminary Charles Lindberg, or to the conservative business class, like Henry Ford, Prescott Bush, and other American industrialists who advocated for a right-wing military strongman in the United States see Denton The rhetorical importance of short wave radio as the premiere medium of German psychological warfare was therefore belied by the actually existing constitution of its listenership.

As a relational space of government and a line of communication, German shortwave radio in the United States was a failure. More successful, however, were the efforts of American interventionists to leverage their own well-established lines of communication to the American public to saturate the press with dire warnings concerning the corrosive effect of German psychological warfare on American minds. In this way, the early American intelligence community was able to construct a new geographical imagination surrounding psychological warfare, based on the perceived compression of time and space achieved by shortwave radio.

Furthermore, interventionist rhetoric sought to dislocate the power of propaganda from the uneven spaces of its circulation and reception to construct a geographical imagination of psychological warfare that operated across space rendered undifferentiated by geopolitical intelligence and expertise. As I have suggested, this rhetorical construction sought to fabricate the experiential dislocation of time-space compression by constructing a geographical imaginary of invisible psychological invasion.

Shortwave radio had formally collapsed the friction of distance, but its lack of an effective listenership belied the fact that it did not represent a revolution of the objective qualities of space and time. Fear of propaganda corresponded in fact more to the debunking culture of the interwar years, and public outrage against both war and war propaganda. Insofar as propaganda did represent am objective dislocation of the habitus, it was pursuant to what I have identified in the previous chapter as the historical development of the press as strategy of pastoral power, culminating in the mass propaganda campaigns of the First World War.

As suggested, the rhetorical scientism of psychological warfare qua psychology served to obscure the material basis of this power, distancing it from the non-technical problem of political duplicity, and locating it within the opaque esoterica of psychological science. As Harvey suggests, the foreboding generated out of the sense of social space imploding in upon us forcibly marked by everything from the daily news to random acts of international terror or global environmental problems translates into a crisis of identity.

If fifth column alarmism articulated the idea of internal threats from abroad, psychological warfare went further still to pose its target as the individual as such. As I have argued, these geographical imaginations emphasized the vulnerability of both the American public and individuals to psychological invasion thereby attempting to obviate the very possibility of isolationism in public discourse.

This argument proceeded apace with the moral economy of bombing, which insisted that aerial bombardment could save lives by speeding Allied victory, shortening war, and preventing battle causalities that would otherwise have taken place. As discussed below, American interventionists played for full value the interwar German literature which, as a face-saving maneuver for a re-militarizing nation, blamed Allied propaganda for their military losses.

Department of the Army Psychological Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Field Manual No. Washington, DC. As Gregory suggests, lawfulness here means not only legality but also a broader claim concerning the production of social order. Most existing accounts are internal critiques of the field interested in tracing the trajectory of psychology through and after the war Hoffman ; Johnson ; Finison , ; Neiburg ; Faye , and do not account for the external political forces which propelled psychological warfare into existence.

These accounts nonetheless help situate and understand the way in which the field of psychology was drawn into the larger construction of psychological warfare, before and after Rather, important forces and influential figures outside the profession dictated the formulation of the problem as a problem. From these groups, psychologists soon organized the Psychologists League which advocated for the employment of psychologists, especially by government.

Though the SPSSI and the Psychologists League shared many goals — most prominently the employment of psychologists — differences consisted in the fact that Psychologists League members were, by and large, clinicians and communists, while the SPSSI were an academic coalition of social democrats and liberals primarily interested in influencing and improving their position within the APA.

It was fitting, then, that the first major publication of the SPSSI was a yearbook on Industrial Conflict, which roused conflicting opinions among its membership on the proper place of social science in politics. It is in the context of these organizations and conflicts that the spectre of psychological warfare descended upon the American psychological community.

Its members were not, however, totally unprepared. In , the APA formed an Emergency Committee to organize psychologists for the possibility of American entry into the war. When morale was discussed, it was understood as soldier morale; as the psychological problems attached to the performance of soldiers in battle. By , however, the issue of civilian morale had become a topic of widespread public discussion.

The psychological community, eager for the coming war work, organized another Emergency Committee in August of under the Division of Anthropology and Psychology of the National Research Council Dallenbach, Nothing was said concerning how war and war propaganda could be analyzed; it was simply and enthusiastically believed that psychologists were capable of doing this.

It is to be hoped that psychologists will seize the opportunity to extend and apply our understanding of these and other problems that have been reviewed here. As summated by the field communist and clinical wing in a Psychologists League Journal editorial, Morale is a means to an end.

What end? And will the methods employed gain morale only to lose its goal? Would psychologists persuade people to sacrifice and endure against their fundamental and ultimate interests? Would they seek to maintain self-defeating morale in which living standards are propelled downward, civil rights abrogated, labor coordinated, minorities persecuted?

The Committee served as a recruiting ground for the nascent American intelligence community, with many of its members going on to work for the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of War Information. See also Schiller Its editor Ladislas Farago was a journalist with a flair for sensationalism, hyperbole, and outright fabrication.

In July , however, as editor of German Psychological Warfare, Farago had the full support of the nascent American intelligence community comprising the membership of the Committee for National Morale. Before this contradiction can be regarded as a basic weakness and danger of the whole German morale policy, it must be remembered that the two approaches are applied in a parallel rather than conflicting manner, providing alternate solutions for solving specific problems.

This emphasis on the individual, however, was mediated through the paradoxical scale of the pastorate to an idea of psychologically warring populations. While the pastoral logic of psychological warfare claimed to target both the omnes et singulatim citizen and citizenry, it remained curiously aspatial, even as it attempted to construct a for itself a geographical imaginary. As [Figs.

TakenfromEndres Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaftund Sozialpolitik. The Committee planned and advocated tirelessly for a national morale service, and for their own employment in it. The Committee argued that effective psychological warfare required extensive intelligence on target populations in allied, neutral and enemy countries; that psychological warfare was impossible without knowledge of the peoples of the target countries.

The statesman as well as the soldier must know the peoples of foreign lands, their desires and aims, the strength of their faith and national pride, their characteristics, impulses and sensitivities, their domestic difficulties and cleavages in CNM , Previously, the Committee argued, primary sources of comparative national psychological intelligence were travel books, which no longer sufficed for waging total war. This necessitated a combination of geographical research and espionage. German Psychological Warfare cited Banse extensively, and reproduced the passage that would come to define him in the American press: Applied psychology as a weapon of war means propaganda intended to influence the mental attitudes of nations toward war In a bizarre political drama, both texts were banned in Germany by the end of , ironically not for opposing the Third Reich, but for the international controversy they provoked by advocating German remilitarization.

Steed levelled especial criticism at a map published in Raum und Volk detailing a theoretical German invasion of Britain [Fig. See above. In the American press see Birchall, Frederick. In , however, the revival of the Banse controversy was animated by a new hysterical geography of psychological invasion.

Significant on this account is the fact that these panics played out in the papers of press baron Lord Northcliffe. It was a face-saving, if fantastic claim for a re-militarizing nation: Germany had not suffered a military defeat, but had been deceived by treacherous propagandists. It was England who instituted the war of starvation, the war of economic annihilation and the war of lies alongside of the war of armies—and scored a thumping success with them.

One does not know whether to be horrified at the vileness, or to admire the clear-headed logic and unshakeable iron determination, which this reveals; the latter attitude will probably carry a nation with its eye on its future further. Furthermore, outside his two explicitly geopolitical texts, Banse was not regarded as a geopolitical thinker. He attempted furthermore to recuperate German racial superiority in the face of defeat in the First World War. Its research staff has more than eighty specialists trained in geography, political science, economics, demography, and perhaps other fields… Agents abroad, probably several hundreds of them, contribute to its store of facts about the non-German earth p.

Like the Royal Geographical Society before the First World War, The German Strategy of World Conquest fomented panic concerning the political role of German geography, and emphasized the decisive importance of geographical knowledge at war. If popular geographical consciousness meant psychological war, the geographers prescribed a programme for imposing order through the dissemination of all the facts needed to give every member of the body politic the best available understanding of the earth… A great deal can be done in the schools, where organized information may be presented and discussed objectively and systematically.

Persons beyond school age can be kept in touch with new knowledge through the press and the radio p. To cultivate for oneself a geographical consciousness was therefore to contribute, as an individual, to a pastoral securitization of the nation through personal and political knowledge. In addition to articulation geographical consciousness as a terrain of psychological struggle, Whittlesey and Hartshorne also framed international propaganda as a new kind of territorial struggle between nations.

He argued that naive confidence in the truthfulness of the map indicates that many of us are not aware… that maps are weapons… [T]he map has become a psychological weapon in a warring world where the souls of men are as strongly attacked as their lives.

Thus while the popular Life magazine sought to abstract and geographically deracinate American empire, the middlebrow Fortune sought to construct a geopolitical imaginary for an American century Smith , xviii, 8 in depicting. It will never go into effect. This map makes clear the Nazi design not only against South America but against the United States itself. The context of Navy Day was significant. As it was Roosevelt's policy to wage war without declaring it Bratzel and Rout , American warships had provoked controversy by engaging German U-Boats while escorting British ships across the Atlantic.

McLeish was, however, a reformer, not a revolutionary. The conviction did not prevent him, however, from serving as editor of Fortune magazine from Here, he would work alongside C. On the significance of liberalism to psychological warfare, see Ch. As head of the OFF, McLeish lobbied press organizations to toe official lines concerning the continued need for psychological defense and the securitization of the American population qua civilian morale. The pamphlet was a testament to the role played by these texts in constructing and sustaining the concept of psychological war.

Like them, Divide and Conquer dramatized German victories in Europe and asserted that psychological war had that secured them. All his tricks are now being directed against us. Hitler knows that in order to conquer the world he must first enslave the mind of man, and toward that end he is carrying out a program of propaganda, blackmail, and death.

Because he fears truth, he has tried every means of wiping it off the face of the earth Office of Facts and Figures , 3. The upraised arm, the shouting voice, the mighty bluster, all mask a mortal dread of the weapon that makes men free: the truth. We are armed with the truth, and we will crush the tyrant OFF , Much of the research preparation has been undertaken under private and educational auspices. Much of the basic work cannot possibly be done by any existing department. Great potentials remain unused to affect here and elsewhere the result in this mortal conflict.

The rhetorical construction of American psychological war therefore created a geopolitical imaginary in which the territorial advance of truth imposed order upon places and people of a world at war, its lawfulness qua truth a self-ordained manifestation of proselytizing Christian morality. Davis and OWI have control will contain or reflect any of these flaws, that they will be honest contributions to the news and not to "psychological"' warfare or mass treatment in the fields of national morale and partisan politics.

They fear the truth, because it is the weapon of destruction for them who have thrived on lies. To all victims of oppression who may hear us… we Americans express the substance of our democratic faith—that the truth is mighty and shall prevail—the truth shall set you free. While it is tempting to dismiss the obvious duplicity of wartime propaganda and its secondary role relative to armed force, consideration of the development of American psychological warfare can aid understanding of how the politics and rhetoric of truth suffused war, and how attempts were made to mediate military force and make it both legible and productive.

As Foucault , 17 suggests, it is often said that, in the final analysis, there is something like a kernel of violence behind all relations of power and that if one were to strip power of its showy garb one would find the naked game of life and death. But can there be power without showy garb? In other words, can there really be a power that would do without the play of light and shadow, truth and error, true and false, hidden and manifest, visible and invisible?

In other words, can there be an exercise of power without a ring of truth? While William Donovan and his network of interventionists sought to leverage the social scientific authority of psychologists to construct the new menace of psychological war, its fictional nature and lack of positive content lead American psychologists to offer as proof, not psychological, but geopolitical texts.

Before its incorporation of extant strategies of combat and consolidation propaganda, outlined in the next chapter, psychological warfare existed first as a geopolitical imaginary of invasion at the pastoral scales of population and individual. Though a marginal figure in Germany, the Banse narrative drew upon and furthered extant constructions of Karl Haushofer and geopolitics as a highly technical and scientific method for waging war.

However, emphasis on truth-content, and on content more generally, also obscured the political economic monopoly of knowledge on which it was the strategy of truth was based. I show how, despite the anti-geopolitical rhetoric of the strategy of truth, in the theatres of Europe and North Africa, psychological warfare became a territorial strategy for governing populations.

While I argue that little evidence exists to suggest that psychological warfare had appreciable effects on enemy troops, I show that behind advancing Allied lines American psychological war was tightly tied to expanding markets for the circulation of American cultural commodities and their corollary depictions of American lifestyle. Finally, I argue that, absent governmental techniques beyond the circulation of products like film and newspaper, aerial bombing became the guiding principle of American psychological warfare, providing it with pseudo-scientific justifications and political rationales.

Propaganda bureaus, Censorship bureaus, Ministries of Information, etc. Yet if the findings of the Morale Service are to be put into effect, the Morale Service will have to exercise some of the functions associated with these unpopular intuitions. It is therefore vitally important to set up the Morale Service in a way which will differentiate it in the public mind form these unpopular institutions and which will make the Public feel that the Service is friendly to them.

As Lasswell Ch. Indiscriminate incredulity was bad for business. Painful conditions and mental conflicts have a way of becoming focal in consciousness. They stand out as etched figures on a ground of marginal awareness; while good morale, like health, is a ground condition, embedded in the matrix of personality. They worked on one word each for greater safety.

One of them saw two words of the joke and spent several weeks in hospital. But apart from that things went pretty quickly, and we soon had the joke by January, in a form which our troops couldn't understand but which the Germans could. He wrote that The Nazi identifies himself with his leader, yields up his own responsibility, his own conscience, and a large portion of his intelligence.

An almost trance-like state results which must be sustained by the trappings, the myths, and the hocus-pocus appropriate to hypnotism. In the exercise of democratic morale, all of one's sentiments, values, and knowledge can be employed. Dryer , deflated several canards that had dominated psychological war alarmism, sardonically noting that radio is a secret weapon.

The secret is how to use it as a weapon. We still have not discovered that secret, nor has any other country. For all the ballyhoo about the power of radio on the psychological front, there is virtually no evidence to substantiate the claims that the microphone is as effective or important a weapon as a bombing plane or a panzer division. Broadcasts to the enemy have a negative purpose to bewilder, to confuse, and to frighten.

On the home front, however, the great creative potential of radio may be used to inspire, influence, and emotionalize public response. Creative radio can exploit "plus symbols" to significant advantage. The audience of entertainment and dramatic programs is ready-made, receptive to interpretation and directives. We know our own people better than we can ever know our enemy. We can communicate with the home front on the standard waveband, and exploit listeners' loyalties to radio and to specific programs p.

In an epistemic coup, Dryer advanced a premise that would remain at the heart of psychological war theory: In the execution of this task [the propagandist] can respect no single fact, no truth, so much that he will refuse to alter it, if it does fit into the total emotional pattern he is designing.

This is less Machiavellian than practical. It is probably the only tactic that will make effective a strategy of democratic propaganda. For what is needed is propaganda for the truth, not a strategy of the truth p. Prior to American entry into the war, interventionists held fast to a rhetorical demarcation between truth and propaganda.

After Pearl Harbor, however, an epistemological perspectivalism emerged in public debates on propaganda and psychological warfare to claim that such demarcations, when they were not simply dangerous to the war effort, were philosophically impossible. The formulation consisted of the premise that since all information is capable of influence, then all information is potentially propaganda. The line of reasoning plainly obscured the massive apparatuses and organization required to conduct large scale propaganda campaigns.

Through a rhetorical sleight of hand, Dryer traded an epistemological appraisal of propaganda for a material one. The pantomime of debate pitted abstract liberal truth against abstract conservative expediency, and had the effect of enshrining bipartisan consensus supporting a large-scale information program, presenting for debate only questions concerning the abstractions of its moral economy. Cracks in the facade of the strategy of truth also emerged from the psychological community.

Sargent , went further to cross once sacrosanct lines. Propaganda may be used to aid American morale by stating and interpreting war aims, by fostering good will toward allies and hatred toward enemies—in fact by any appeal to reason or emotion which may evoke confidence, enthusiasm, and determined effort p. What Allport had expended so much effort to construct — the idea that the strength of democratic morale was based upon liberal ideas of reasoned consent — was swept away.

Gone were saccharine calls for democratic morale, however earnest or cynical. Army, remarked "it's all propaganda, but I guess it's true. Floyd Allport soon repeated the experiment, expanding the study to headlines. Concurrently, Gordon Allport conducted a survey of 3, headlines and found that the majority of newspapers favoured optimistic headlines when reporting the war.

Strategic candor emphatically did not mean the unregulated release of news. The problem facing the psychological warrior was therefore a matter of judgement concerning what and how much negative news to circulate in order to simulate candor and dissimulate artifice. I argue that, in practice, American psychological warfare at the OWI attempted to secure populations, both at home and abroad, through a liberal strategy of managing the contingent freedom of news circulation.

What in fact emerged was a strategy of territory. The British historian A. It was the same passage quoted above p. It would be necessary to know how many printing presses existed in a given territory, along with the political tendencies of their proprietors and editors. In the summer of , the Office of Strategic Services OSS made an extensive report on existing propaganda efforts already underway in North Africa, outlining the various groups and factions among the populations.

In radio, psychological warfare operations preceded the African landings with the British Political Warfare Executive arriving in Gibraltar as early as May to monitor neutral and enemy radio broadcasts. Over five million leaflets had been prepared by the British Political Intelligence Division in London, and approved by Allied Headquarters.

The leaflets asked French forces and the local population to welcome American troops as liberators: We come to you to liberate you from your conquerors, whose only desire is to deprive you of your sovereign right to worship freely and your right to live your way of life in peace…We come to you solely to defeat your enemies — we wish you no harm.

We come to you with the assurance that we will leave as soon as the menace of Germany and Italy is dissipated. Help us and the day of universal peace will arrive. Giraud had been living in Algiers after a high-profile escape from a German POW prison near Dresden, and Eisenhower believed that his word might hold sway over the French troops Langer In his broadcast, Giraud announced to the French soldiers that he was assuming their command. However, he was largely ignored, and Vichy troops offered stiff resistance to the landings.

What leaflets were dropped often drifted out to sea, or were lost in the desert Hall Nonetheless, aerial leaflet drops were refined through trial and error [Fig. Like their steel counterparts, leaflet bombs often missed their targets by wide margins. Freidman n. The design was meant to mimic the aesthetic of official passports ibid. The Afrika-Post [Fig. Additionally, occupying territory in North Africa allowed the Allies to build a reception and monitoring station in Bouzarea, near Algiers, where news from British and American stations in Europe could be received and repurposed for local circulation, creating a vital line of communication from OWI offices in London and New York to the North African theatre Hall In Algiers, the Allies also constructed their first major broadcast station of the war.

A massive 50 kilowatt radio transmitter that had been decommissioned by the American Broadcasting Corporation ABC was shipped intact directly from New York City on the deck of an American warship. Unlike Giraud, Darlan had real authority over Vichy troops, and after his capture Eisenhower secured his collaboration, effectively ending Vichy French resistance.

To deal with the controversy, C. Oh, for one little act to give meaning to those words! Though he would be remembered for his career as president of three major American universities, during WWII Milton Eisenhower was a crucial intermediary between the Allied psychological warfare effort and private American media companies.

This public-private partnership was portrayed in the United States as productively antagonistic, one providing a check and balance upon the other. For Milton Eisenhower, however, the war was an opportunity, not to oppose public and private prerogatives, but to unite them. He saw the war as an opportunity both to open global markets to commercial American media, and to establish permanent outposts for American information programs after the war. Though heavy government involvement would be initially required, Eisenhower envisioned a global post-war communication system dominated by American capital, a strategy of public-private partnership to expand the remit of American commercial media activity, and to make private media the avant-garde of American psychological warfare.

As an executive of the Office of War Information, Milton Eisenhower was a key figure in setting up a capitalist biopolitical economy behind Allied lines, making audiences and populations accessible to American research and information programs. After an initial phase of biopolitical intervention in which the undesirable circulation of German and Vichy French films had been curtailed, OWI began to circulate commercial American films which had been stockpiled in advance of the landings.

When the Allies took Sicily in the summer of , stockpiled Hollywood films entered Italy through supply lines in North Africa, and desirable film circulation was set up as Axis films were confiscated OWI , Returning damaged cinemas to working order was a top priority for the OWI as Allied forces advanced through Italy. In practice, this meant an ad hoc licensing system whereby theatre owners were given custodian operation of their theatres on the basis that film selection would remain in the hands of the OWI.

The licensing system gave the impression of liberal contractual reciprocity, when in reality owners had little choice but to comply with OWI directives. When occupied Italian territory was secure enough for commercial cinema operation to resume, OWI coordinated liaison between Hollywood representatives and local cinemas to arrange the continued distribution of American films, largely repeating the process pioneered in the North African theatre.

In the newspaper industry, a licensing system similar to that of the film industry was established, and papers which deviated from Allied messaging were censured and threatened with suspension NYT , Feb More illustrative, however, is the method by which psychological warriors set to re-establishing the Italian press.

The agency drew criticism, however, not least from Luigi Barzini Jr. What had begun as a relatively small operation in the Summer of had by grown into a massive, near-global information program. OWI London oversaw a number of divisions under its command. Finally, OWI London produced over fifteen tons of leaflets every day, most of which were dropped from aircraft over enemy territory.

After tip of the spear operations, OWI generally turned over these functions to private hands, though under the conditional licensing system discussed above. What the world could see of the war was now administrable from one site. As one OWI , 14 report noted, the radio photo allowed for the [distribution of] pictures originating in this pacific theatre direct to 65 OWl outposts and State Department missions throughout the world, thus enabling them to tell in each area the picture story of the U.

The radiophoto allowed for rapid visual coverage and framing of events in territories behind advancing Allied lines. When the French Second Armoured Division returned to the continent in Normandy, the Picture Division sent out eight radiophotos as flash coverage, and within 24 hours it had sent over 10, prints and negatives to all parts of the world.

At the end of , press runs for Voir stood at ,, for Kijk ,, and for Fotorevy 20, The former were sold through regular commercial agencies, while Fotorevy was smuggled into Norway and was clandestinely distributed free of charge. The digests were edited jointly by Americans, British and in most cases representatives of the target nation. This sanguine litany was remarkable not only as preview of Cold War public diplomacy, but also for what it obscured — namely, race and class conflict in the United States — and the longstanding Cold War presentation of American culture as a cipher for liberal-capital order contra the Soviet Union.

However, American psychological warfare during World War II often prefigured Cold War public diplomacy, and in many cases, as I have shown, created the political and economic infrastructure for it. In publishing especially, the OWI attempted to reach specific audiences.

Conversely, when it suited the target audience, the OWI portrayed the United States as liberal and progressive on the issue of race. Even in the US Army, black Americans largely served in segregated units, and representations of black Americans were almost entirely absent from general OWI publications like Victory magazine, and especially in publications aimed to conservative audiences, like De Amerikaansche Vrouw.

It is no small irony, then, that during the Cold War Robeson would become blacklisted in the United States for his support of the American communist party. This emphasis on mass industrial production, however, again unsettled quarters of European conservatism, whose naturalistic worldview chafed at the image of American wartime industry in which towering machines dwarfed the human.

For Lerner, the commodity itself is a powerful talisman for the psychological warrior. The following year, McLeish wrote Air Raid, another radio play on the theme of terror bombing, and its presumed uniqueness to fascism. Again like psychological warfare, knowledge from experience that terror bombing did not succeed in demoralizing civilian populations was obscured by its popular construction in the press as effective strategy for producing mass panic and social disintegration.

Though it had been understood that bombing civilians galvanized morale, popular narrations of efficacious terror bombing, like those of McLeish, were used as rhetorical strategies in the United States to awaken Americans to threat of European fascism. There is no need to smash them physically; instead they must be dislocated psychologically, and then they become more useful to the enemy alive than dead.

See Sleeper , Neocleous , Gregory Tragically, again as with psychological warfare, the second-order context of terror bombing as a rhetorical strategy without content was lost. Psychologists perhaps had good reason to desire consultation from American war planners. As discussed in the previous chapter, psychologists eager for war work accepted and advanced the premise that psychological expertise could become integral to technocratic forms of government in which their services would be required and valued.

It was a grim, if typical, example of the speculation and conjecture tendered as scientific authority around the Allied program of urban destruction. American morale, confused and divided at the time, was welded and galvanized into action by the attack on Pearl Harbor.

While behind Allied lines the OWI served the prerogatives of American liberal capitalism, beyond the front American psychological warriors sought to reach and influence enemy populations in new and often terrifying ways. Very soon they may become a theater of war. In view of these facts I am giving you the following warning: the rear communications of the remnants of the German Army retreating into Germany will be subjected to bombing as devastating as that which preceded and accompanied the Allied campaign in Normandy.

Civilians are hereby warned that everyone who lives or works in the vicinity of road, railroad and canal communications; of military depots, camps and installations; or factories working for the Nazi war machine, must from now on reckon that they will not be saved from high level or low-level air attack at any hour of the day or night. Though there was little chance of Germans civilians abandoning their locations as directed — an act tantamount to open rebellion against the Nazi regime — the warning appeals satisfied the conceit that civilian casualties were incidental, rather than central to, aerial bombing.

Furthermore, warning appeals allowed for the United States to displaced a degree of responsibility for bombing casualties onto the victims themselves. While a ballistic metaphor was central to the popular constructions of psychological warfare outlined in the previous chapter, it was the experience of the Second World War that solidified this strange connection between ordinance and ordnance As Wilbur Schramm , 8 argued after the war, the reason for speaking of [psychological warfare] as an application of science you will grasp at once form what it has in common with another area of military study, namely, ballistics.

Figure Fortress Europe has no roof Figure The heaviest bombing to date British and American leaflets advertised the scale of Allied bombing in Germany, to both Germany and France. Moreover, psychological warfare was meant to make terror bombing not only socially legible to its victims, but politically legible to allies and potential enemies. In this way, the OWI understood that bombing was communication, and they attempted to ensure that bombs communicated the right message.

While Allied bombers had taken heavy losses to German fighters and air defences in late , between January and the D-Day landings in June, long range fighters escorted Allied bombers to Germany, resulting in fewer losses for Allied aircraft and more for the Luftwaffe. By the spring of , however, the Luftwaffe often declined to fly intercept sorties, electing to conserve fighters instead of sending them to likely destruction.

But what if it declined to come up and fight? Then we would still get return on our stake, because we would make the German civilians and soldiers on the ground even more anxious and resentful than before over its failure to defend them. A sample OWI news story read: It looks like the Luftwaffe has decided that the Germans on the ground must bear the brunt of the air war.

But this seems to be a very strange policy —— if it is a policy. Variations on this theme were reiterated regardless of the amount of opposition faced. The second phase of the campaign consisted of a similar strategy, but against oil refineries and lines of communication in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The strategy was to lure Luftwaffe planes away from the western front to defend Allied bombing in the Balkans.

This strategy had the added benefit of attempting to undermine Balkan support for the German effort. Again, the strategy was to kill civilians and blame the Luftwaffe, either for cowardice or ineptitude. Though there is little to actually recommend this conclusion, it has nonetheless formed a central pillar of American warfighting.

By the end of the war, the sibling relationship between communication and bombing in war saw psychological warfare not only supplementing bombing raids, but in many cases supplying its very rationale. As in Germany, allied commanders believed that through bombing they could create and subjugate a line of communication to the people of Japan.

Central to racist constructions of the Japanese people was the conviction that they were, unlike the European belligerents, irrational. The perception of Japanese fanaticism persisted even against dissenting Army intelligence reports which observed that during the Russo-Japanese war Japanese troops had surrendered when faced with impossible odds. Again despite knowledge to the contrary, the picture of the Japanese individual as fundamentally irrational served an important rhetorical function in the planning and execution of the bombing campaigns against Japan.

Under Leighton, FMAD had discovered that factions of the Japanese population — particularly students, factory workers, and Christians — were being scapegoated for the failing war effort, and that turnover had increased in top political posts. In abridged form, Morale Analysis concluded that 1. A significant number of Japanese think the Allies will win and are consequently disposed to pay attention to what we tell them.

There is widespread apathy toward the war effort 3. There is a great fear of what Americans will do when they land. It is therefore important to reassure the Japanese and try to prevent them fighting vigorously from terror. These findings, however, were met with hostility from top OWI officials who were committed to the myth of invincible Japanese morale.

With the capture of Saipan in May of , however, American commanders committed to a strategy of aerial bombing that control over the island enabled. Elaborating a theory of Japanese quasi-humanity, Kluckhohn , wrote that An American prisoner of war still felt himself to be an American and looked forward to resuming his normal place in American society after the war. A Japanese prisoner, however, conceived of himself as socially dead.

He regarded his relations with his family, his friends, and his country as finished. But since he was still physically alive he wished to affiliate himself with a new society. To the astonishment of their American captors, many Japanese prisoners wished to join the American Army emphasis mine. See Chapter 5. The incongruity, however, rests on a cultural point. The Judaic-Christian tradition is that of absolute morality… To anthropologists who had steeped themselves in Japanese literature it was clear that Japanese morality was a situational one.

Yet, the minute one was in situation B, the rules of situation A no longer applied. Here too American social scientists lent support and authority. In this regard Committee for National Morale member Geoffrey Gorer was particularly risible in attributing presumed 69 It seems prudent to question the extent to which Japanese POWs really were as fervently pro-American, as Kluckhohn suggests.

Again, what Gregory identities as a pillar of the moral economy of bombing — imposing law on the lawless — played out in the administration of psychological warfare. Before the capture of Saipan, American psychological war leaflets were infrequently dropped on Japan due to the distance and difficulty of getting them there. With the capture of Saipan, and soon Okinawa, the OWI initiated a new psychological war strategy to test drop leaflets in advance of bombing raids instead of concurrently with them.

The OWI strategy attempted to maximize the terror of bombing raids by distributing leaflets which informed civilians that their city had been marked for destruction by the US Airforce. The leaflet, however, was meant to contextualize the coming bombing raids, and imbue them with social meaning beyond the simple and unlikely directive of revolt: These leaflets are being dropped to notify you that your city has been listed for destruction by our powerful air force.

The bombing will begin in 72 hours. The advance notice will give your military authorities ample time to take necessary defensive measures to protect you from our inevitable attack.

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Military history provides a rich literature on war and technology, but its focus has tended to be on the importance of technology in helping militaries win wars. However, my aim is to turn this domain upside down and explore not just how the world has changed and continues to change war, but how the war—technology dynamic has changed the world, in what might be described as a form of positive feedback. To this end, I expand and build on the historical overview presented by William McNeill and Maurice Pearton of the financial and technical linkages forged between war and the state starting in the late nineteenth century.

Most importantly, this construct allows the contemporary war—state relationship to be viewed through a different lens, one that sees a stronger, darker and more damaging connection than is generally recognized. In addressing this issue, I have relied on the experiences of the United States and United Kingdom, as representative examples of western states, to support the propositions set out here.

Most importantly, in both cases the state played a leading role in promoting defence research after ; technology was of central importance in their strategic frameworks, and continues to be so today. Second, both states consciously exploited defence technology to promote wider economic prosperity. I recognize that attempts to look into the future carry a great deal of risk. I am aware of this risk and explain below how I have taken it into account.

The only general point I would make here is that history also shows that, sometimes, military forecasting is successful. I have looked at these examples and drawn on their methodologies. In sum, the central argument of this article is that, after , technology acted as a vital agent of change in the war—state relationship, and eventually the ripples of this change spread throughout society. To illustrate this point, you have only to look at the ubiquitous smartphone and the genesis of technologies produced by defence research that made it possible.

This capability has in turn affected the conduct of war; and this has affected the state. Thus the smartphone provides just one significant example of how technology and war are shaping the state and the world we live in. The article is divided into three parts. The first explores the war—state relationship and the factors that shaped it during the Cold War. It explains why technological innovation became so important in war, and how this imperative influenced both our understanding of war and the interaction between war and the state.

The second section examines why the imperative for technological innovation persisted, and why the war—state infrastructure survived in the post-Cold War era. Finally, the third section explores how current trends might influence the war—state relationship in the future.

Clausewitz missed the importance of technology as a variable in his analysis of war. The first was the impact of the Industrial Revolution. This period of sustained and rapid technological innovation eventually affected all areas of human activity, including war. Evidence of the increased pace in technological change can be seen from Schumpeter's economic analysis of capitalism and its relationship to technology. In his view, four long economic cycles in the Industrial Revolution led to ground-breaking changes in the mode of production in little more than a hundred years.

However, this situation slowly changed such that the demands for military technology eventually shaped the wider context in which it existed—which brings us to the second reason why the importance of technology increased.

O'Neill demonstrates how the state began to assume a role as a sponsor of technological innovation in defence in the late nineteenth century as the military became increasingly interested in the exploitation of technology. The demands of war also resulted in the state expanding into the provision of education and health care to ensure the population was fit to wage war. Even liberal Britain succumbed to this view of the state.

The advent of the nuclear age precipitated a profound change in the organization and conduct of war. Hables Gray asserts that marks the dividing line between modern war and the birth of what he terms post-modern war. This new strategic setting precipitated what Holsti described as the diversification of warfare; and this in turn resulted in a blurring of the line between peace and war as governments employed a range of means to achieve their policy goals below the threshold of general war.

Most importantly, the forms of war proliferated as new ways were devised to employ war as a political tool in a nuclear world. However, in examining the post war—state relationship in the West, we need to revise our understanding of war so that it extends beyond physical violence and bloodshed.

Russian military reflections on the Cold War reveal an interesting narrative that reinforces this expansion of war beyond its traditional domain. According to this analysis, the Soviet Union lost the Cold War because it was defeated by non-military means employed by its enemy that focused on psychological, political, information, social and economic attacks against the Soviet state.

Technology played a vital role in facilitating this process, for example via the communications revolution, which facilitated the waging of activities such as political warfare. However, the most salient aspect of the Cold War was the discourse of deterrence. Within this context, the rituals of war in terms of organizing, preparing and demonstrating an ability to fight nuclear war in the hope of deterring potential opponents and thereby preventing the possibility of war became substitutes for organized violence.

Small wars happened on the periphery of the US and Soviet geopolitical space, but in the core region, a different kind of cognitive and cultural violence emerged, which can be seen as a form of war. How, then, did technology fit into this new discourse of war? According to Buzan, because nuclear deterrence relied on anticipated weapons performance, it became sensitive to technical innovation, which meant the state had to respond to technological change by investing in defence research to maintain the credibility of its deterrent.

The role of the state was vital because it was the state that provided the critical financial resources required to take embryonic technologies and develop them at a speed unlikely to be matched by the civilian market. The end of the Cold War resulted in a significant fall in defence expenditure. Equally importantly, the state reduced its participation in sustaining defence research and allowed the private sector to play a more prominent role in defence production.

In the UK, where the nationalized defence industries had already been privatized in the s, this process was extended to include the sale of the state's defence research and development arm. This change in industrial and technological policy reflected a broader adjustment as the state lost its position in the vanguard of the technological revolution.

Since the start of the Cold War, US government-funded defence research had given rise to technologies such as the internet, virtual reality, jet travel, data joining, closed-circuit TV, global positioning, rocketry, remote control, microwaves, radar, global positioning, networked computers, wireless communications and satellite surveillance.

The critical difference between innovation in the defence market and its civilian counterpart was that, in the latter, high rates of consumption led to product and process innovation by companies. As a result, civil technology providers increasingly took the lead in the information revolution.

Given this new dynamism, military power relied increasingly on the existing pool of technological knowledge within the broader economy. The increasing emphasis on quality in war also generated greater complexity during operations. This trend facilitated the rise of private military companies in the post-Cold War era and resulted in western states increasingly subcontracting the provision of internal and external security to the private sector.

However, in spite of the end of the Cold War, western governments continued to have an appetite for technological innovation and its integration into ever more complex weapons. Indeed, an important feature of post-modern war was that machines assumed an unprecedented importance in the post-Cold War era.

In postmodern war, the central role of human bodies in war is being eclipsed rhetorically by the growing importance of machines. The First Gulf War was an important marker because it revealed to western society the power of technology, at least in a conventional war. As Freedman observed, this conflict resolved the high-tech versus low-tech debate which had persisted throughout the Cold War.

Technology allowed western states to engage targets at long range with high accuracy, but at no risk to those firing the weapons—something that became very useful in an era of wars of choice. Technological innovation in the techniques of war allowed the state to continue using force as an instrument of policy, especially in those instances where there was no clear political consensus on taking military action.

The idea of an MIC persists today. For example, David Keen points to the powerful economic functions fulfilled by the war on terror, which he believed explained the persistence of a war based on counterproductive strategy and tactics. During this period technology was viewed almost as a silver bullet. As such, it provided a neat answer to complex questions posed by the human and physical terrain of war.

Most importantly, for a brief moment at least, it allowed western states to reimagine decisive victories and tidy peace settlements. How, then, will predicted developments in technology shape the future of war and the state? This is a question that is causing much anxiety in both academic and policy-making circles. As Freedman points out, the future is based on decisions that have yet to be made in circumstances that remain unclear to those looking into a crystal ball.

Cohen has pointed out that debates on the future of war often suffer from being technologically sanitized, ignoring politics and therefore lacking a meaningful context. I address these problems in two ways.

The first is to follow the advice offered by the sociologist Michael Mann, who observed that no one could accurately predict the future of large-scale power structures like the state; the most one can do is provide alternative scenarios of what might happen given different conditions, and in some cases to arrange them in order of probability. To this end, I adopt here the Clausewitzian framework of analysis which Colin Gray employed in considering future war.

As he explains:. Both avenues must be travelled here. Future warfare viewed as grammar requires us to probe probable and possible developments in military science, with reference to how war actually could be waged. From the perspective of policy logic we need to explore official motivations to fight.

In exploring the future relationship between war and the state, and the role played by technology, two possible visions are presented here. The first explores the continuation of the status quo and represents the default setting of both the UK and US governments with regard to the future. The second follows the recommendation offered by Paul Davis, who advised when selecting a scenario to choose a vision that challenges and provokes controversy and that breaks out of orthodox thinking.

Both models have one thing in common: they will be influenced by what might be seen as the next wave of technological change. This latest technical convulsion is illustrated by Schwab's idea of the fourth Industrial Revolution, which is a crude facsimile of Schumpeter's theory of long economic cycles. According to his definition, AI is merely the development of computer systems to perform tasks that generally need human intelligence, such as speech recognition, visual perception and decision-making.

More recently, Max Tegmark has defined AI as a non-biological intelligence possessing the capability to accomplish any complex task at least as well as humans. Digital technologies that have computer hardware, software and networks at their core are not new, but represent a break with the third Industrial Revolution because of the level of sophistication and integration within and between them. These technologies are transforming societies and the global economy. The fourth Industrial Revolution is not only about smart and connected machines and systems.

It is linked with other areas of scientific innovation ranging from gene sequencing to nanotech and from renewables to computing. It is the fusion of these technologies and their interaction across the physical, digital and biological domains that make the fourth Industrial Revolution fundamentally different from previous epochs.

Emerging technologies and broad-based innovations are diffusing much more quickly and more widely than their predecessors, which continue to unfold in some parts of the world. It took the spindle, the hallmark of the first Industrial Revolution, years to spread outside Europe; by contrast, the internet permeated the globe in less than a decade. What, then, does this mean for the relationship between war and the state? In this version of the future, the policy logic of war remains focused on the security of the state and concentrates on state-based threats.

The principal causes of war can be identified in the anarchy of the international system. In addition, the state continues to function effectively and to be able to extract the resources needed to maintain its legitimacy and territorial integrity. Within this context, the state still pursues the development of advanced technologies to defend against mostly state-based threats. In this scenario, future war is imagined as a symmetrical contest between conventional forces on an increasingly automated battlefield.

Within this space, humans will be augmented and in some instances replaced by AI and robots contending with increasingly lethal forms of weaponry. In this vision of the future, the military's pursuit of the next technology follows a familiar pattern, and the risk and uncertainty involved continue to make state finance and policy support indispensable to defence research.

The most recent example of this activity is the UK government's promise to share with British Aerospace the cost of funding the development of a technology demonstrator for the next generation of fighter aircraft. Named Tempest, this fighter can operate either as a manned or as an unmanned aircraft; it will rely on AI and employ directed energy weapons. At the core of the Third Offset is the intention to exploit advances in machine autonomy, AI, quantum computing and enhanced digital communications to improve the man—machine interface in the future battlespace.

It is important to note that non-western states are also pursuing these policies. The outstanding example here is China. Its economic model, which is based on state-sponsored capitalism, is enabling it to work in a close partnership with privately owned Chinese tech firms to achieve a broad-based technological self-sufficiency in both commerce and defence.

These are semiconductors, quantum computing and AI. In this scenario, then, the state can harvest and refine a range of new technologies generated by the private rather than the public sector in a manner that preserves its monopoly on the use of force. At the same time, that monopoly is reinforced because of the complexity of these capabilities and the challenges posed in their use on operations, which require well-trained and professional forces.

Private military companies will persist, but their existence will rely on their ability to draw on this pool of trained personnel created by the state to populate their organizations, which means they will support, not challenge, the state's role as a provider of security.

In the second scenario of the future, the policy logic of war reflects a darker, dystopian image of the relationship between war and the state. In this setting, conflict is a product of desperation caused by scarcity, which is occurring on a global scale. Most importantly, the causes of war lie within states as well as between them. In this multifaceted crisis, technological change is weakening rather than strengthening the state and undermining its ability to cope with the tsunami of problems sweeping over it.

The debate over this view of the future policy logic of war began in with the publication of a hugely controversial book called The limits to growth. Its principal conclusion was that population growth would create an insatiable demand for goods, outstripping the finite resource base of the planet. Humanity's efforts to address this imbalance in demand and supply by increasing productivity would be self-defeating and cause a host of environmental problems.

In spite of the passage of time since its first appearance, this book set out themes that are explicitly linked to the spectrum of security issues we face today. There is a general assumption that the worst effects of these environmental trends will be for the most part experienced outside the western world.

Even when western states are affected, it is assumed, rich countries will possess the financial means to weather this future storm. However, a recent report by Laybourn-Langton and colleagues challenges this simplistic assumption and points to the social and economic harm being caused globally by current forms of human-induced environmental change. These authors also demonstrate that no region of the world will be untouched by this phenomenon, and use the UK as a case-study to illustrate the point.

In their view, the degradation of the environment will interact with existing political and economic trends to undermine the cohesion and internal stability of states across the globe. Current trends suggest that a potential environmental crisis might run in parallel with a possible economic crisis. Ironically, the source of this predicament lies in potential problems generated by the fourth Industrial Revolution.

Like the military, business is also fast approaching a time when machine intelligence can perform many of the functions hitherto carried out by humans in a range of occupations. As McAfee and Brynjolfson explain, innovation was hugely advantageous in those occupations which relied on physical labour, allowing new forms of economic activity and employment based on human cognitive abilities to develop. As in the military domain, so in our economic and political affairs it is predicted that AI will precipitate a revolution.

A PriceWaterhouseCooper report predicted that 38 per cent of all jobs in the United States are at high risk of automation by the early s. This depressing analysis is supported by the Bank of England's estimate that up to 15 million jobs are at risk in the UK from increasingly sophisticated robots, and that their loss will serve to widen the gap between rich and poor.

As in the past, those most affected by this change will be the economically least powerful sectors of society—the old, and unskilled and unorganized labour. Until now, the managerial and professional classes have been able to use their economic and political positions to protect themselves from the worst effects of such crises.

Any job that can be done via the application of pattern-searching algorithms will be vulnerable. This includes banking and finance, the law and even education. Daniela Russ has argued that humans need the personal touch in their day-to-day lives and that humans are therefore guaranteed to have a place in the job market.

In their investigation of the use of AI in the provision of psychological therapy, they found people preferred the treatment offered by the AI precisely because it was a machine and so they did not feel judged. The system can also be configured to fit people's preferences, creating a 3D computer-generated image that is comforting and reassuring.

A significant limitation of AI and machine technology is that currently they cannot replicate the dexterity of humans in handling delicate objects, and this does leave a role for humans in the workplace. However, scientists in California are looking at the use of AI and machine technology as a way of addressing the acute labour shortages experienced in the fruit-picking industry; this includes the development of machines capable of deciding which fruit is ripe for picking, and doing so in a way that does not damage the produce during picking, processing or distribution.

Given these developments, Harari's prediction for humans in the workplace is bleak. Further evidence to support the depressing scenario depicted here is provided by the former head of Google China, Dr Kai-Fu Lee, a man with decades of experience in the world of AI. Most importantly, the new jobs created by computers did not generate a massive number of jobs. What then are the political and security implications of this profound economic change in terms of war and the state?

According to Wolf, three factors might determine how well the state deals with these challenges: first, the speed and severity of the transformation we are about to experience; second, whether the problem is temporary or likely to endure; and third, whether the resources are available to the state to mitigate the worst effects of these changes. In the past, western governments have deployed a range of policies to deal with recessions or, as in the s, scarcity of resources such as oil.

However, these macroeconomic policy responses operated on the assumption that such crises were temporary, and that economic growth would resume and normality be restored quickly if the right measures were in place. In contrast, the environmental crisis and the AI revolution are happening rapidly and both will be enduring features of economic and political life.

In Wolf's view, this latest revolution will require a radical change in our attitude towards work and leisure, with the emphasis on the latter. He also believes we will need to redistribute wealth on a large scale. In the absence of work, the government might resort to providing a basic income for every adult, together with funds for education and training.

The revenue to fund such a scheme could come from tax increases on pollution and other socially negative behaviours. In addition, intellectual property, which will become an important source of wealth, could also be taxed. However, the introduction of these measures will not necessarily prevent a rise in politically motivated violence.

As Gurr explains, recourse to political violence is caused primarily not by poverty but by relative deprivation. Relative deprivation applies to both the individual and the group. Seen in this light, the bright, shiny new world created by AI provides a potentially rich environment for relative deprivation—particularly if large swathes of the middle classes are frustrated in their ambitions and suffer a loss of status as a socio-economic group.

Within this scenario, states in the western world will struggle just as much as states in the developing world. If the legitimacy of the state is measured in terms of its capacity to effectively administer a territory under its control, then the political context set out here poses a significant threat to this institution.

I argue throughout that domestic constructions of psychological warfare within the United States are intimately linked to the prosecution of war abroad. Framings of psychological warfare to the America public have invariably accompanied the practice of American psychological warfare in the theatre. I illustrate the ways in which domestic framings of psychological warfare, like those above concerning Iraq and Afghanistan, have had the purpose of constructing and advancing the moral economy of psychological warfare in an effort to make war both necessary and permissible.

Furthermore, I argue that domestic narrations of psychological warfare have the secondary effect of prefiguring psychological war not just as something that occurs in the various locales of American military intervention, but as a kind of collective political-military struggle occurring within the United States to which ordinary Americans can contribute as assets or liabilities.

In Chapter 3, I show that the emergence of psychological warfare as a concept was tied to the contingent circumstances surrounding the question of American intervention in World War II. In Chapter 2, therefore, I offer historical and theoretical considerations on communication as a system of liberal power in the West. I proceed to apply this analytic frame to a study of the rise of the liberal press in the nineteenth century United States.

As will be seen, this pastoral structure — attempts to tie the government of populations to the government of individuals — becomes a lasting and salient feature of psychological warfare in the twentieth century. Specifically, I show how public anger over the excesses of government propaganda created the imperative for governments both to eschew the term and to foment popular panic over the threat of foreign propaganda within their own country.

Contrary to its humanitarian claim to save lives, psychological warfare strengthened military rationales for the continuation and escalation of the Allied program of bombing civilian populations. I argue, therefore, that actually existing American psychological warfare proceed along the two main lines of territory and terror. In this way, American psychological warfare operated by attempting to establish liberal-capitalist hegemony in the field of news, entertainment and communication by controlling the production and circulation of media in occupied countries, before turning facilities over to friendly anti-communist liberal actors.

I show, furthermore, that the OWI pursued a prototypically neoliberal strategy to project American political and economic power through the privatization of the cultural industries in the countries in which it operated. I conclude the chapter by considering the formative relationship between American psychological warfare and American aerial bombardment.

Despite eagerness in both camps, fear of exposure halted its development until the Central Intelligence Agency took responsibility for psychological war soon after its establishment in Through a massive domestic publicity campaign, the CIA entrenched the pastoral geopolitical imaginary advanced in the years before American entry into the Second World War. Americans were again primary targets of American psychological warfare.

Mirroring the way in which the language of psychological warfare replaced the unpopular language of propaganda, I show how the abandonment of terminology surrounding psychological warfare nonetheless involved an entrenchment of both its practice and the geopolitical imaginations cultivating it. In chapter 6, I draw upon the archives of the United States Information Agency to construct a picture of American psychological warfare in Vietnam.

Furthermore, psychological war in Vietnam furthered the gulf between its self-understanding as a humane alternative to violence and its actual existence refining the coercive legibility of military violence. I show that, contrary to its claim to be guided by expert knowledge, American psychological warriors in Vietnam remained deeply isolated from knowledge of the political motivations of the ordinary Vietnamese villagers on whom they understood the psychological war to turn.

Despite their ability to construct ever larger apparatuses for the dissemination of psychological war materials, American psychological warriors in Vietnam failed to construct the governable subjects they sought to produce. This dissertation argues that there is little evidence to support the thesis that nations are capable of appreciably influencing, persuading, or governing the populations of other countries at war.

Few will need to be persuaded that the United States did not achieve these objectives in these wars, however it remains to be understood how and why psychological warfare has persisted as both a political rhetoric and a strategy of war.

Perhaps more surprising, however, has been the conclusion of its relatively short stasis during the Obama presidency, and its subsequent return in force, now connected to a new political rhetoric of cybernetic arcana. This dissertation concludes by drawing upon its 12 constitutive parts to help explain the psychological war phoenix again reborn in the American political imaginary.

This chapter serves not only to introduce the theoretical tools which I shall employ to discuss the emergence and development of American psychological warfare in the twentieth century, but also to situate it with respect to the specific dynamics of the American liberal press. Similarly, see Marx for a discussion of the limits of political economy. See p. While liberal conceptions of time-space compression imagine the production of homogenous space Barry , I argue that the power of the press is rooted in its ability to administer pastoral spaces that connect the operation of power between the scales of population and the individual.

Finally, I show that, in the wake of the large-scale propaganda operations by the belligerent nations of WWI, a new 15 liberal critique of democracy emerged which further articulated the pastoral prerogatives of American political elites to fabricate political order through the management public opinion.

As Elden shows, however, the departure was in fact an effort to identify the historical origins of his primary research interests, most present in his Security, Territory, 16 Population lectures: modern governmentality as it emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries, and the Christian pastorate on top of which he argues it was built. For geographers working with the concept of pastoral power see Reid-Henry ; Garmany ; Huxley Not power.

But if he can be induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain way. His freedom has been subjected to power. He has been submitted to government. If an individual can remain free, however little his freedom may be, power can subject him to government. There is no power without potential refusal or revolt. Recalling his analysis of the human sciences in The Order of Things, Foucault identified sexuality as a critical terrain for the classification and administration of individuals, one deeply tied to the pastoral tradition.

As he suggests , , analytical identification, subjection, and subjectivation subjectivation are the characteristic procedures of individualization that will in fact be implemented by the Christian pastorate and its institutions. What the history of the pastorate involves, therefore, is the entire history of procedures of human individualization in the West.

Foucault , 43 argues that, contrary to prior juridical injunctions against the practice of sodomy, the new scientia sexualis invented the homosexual as a species. As noted, the specification of sexuality was central to this process in the nineteenth century, but it was not the only arena in which individuals became specified. In this chapter I show that a more general and intense specification of individuals occurs in correspondence to the emergence of the daily press and the development of its economic prerogative to produce and refine specific and specified audiences.

I argue, therefore, that the history of the press takes pastoral form: the emergence of ever larger audiences is accompanied by greater refinements in audience measurement and segmentation, leading to the indispensable objects of analysis for the study of psychological warfare: the audience and individual as targets — omnes et singulatim.

Economy and opinion are the two major aspects of the field of reality, the two correlative elements of the field of reality that is emerging as the correlate of government. This development, moreover, had a profound effect not only in the United States, but also in numerous other states where the structure of a commercial and private press obtained. In this understanding, communication is not only the transportation of goods, or the transmission of information — as in its flattened, post-telegraphic sense — but the production of culture.

Moreover, the structure of the press is uniquely pastoral insofar as mechanical reproduction of the newssheet standardized the experience of individuals at larger urban, regional and national population scales. In the next two sections, I discuss the ways in which the historical development of the means of communication contribute both to the compression of time and space, but also to the production 23 of new spaces of pastoral power that correspond to and combine the scales of population and individuals, respectively.

In this section I argue that the expanding scale of information circulation, and increasing concentration of control over it, produced spaces of pastoral power aimed at the government of populations omnes. In the next section, I go on show how this space combined with its pastoral counterpart to produce domestic spaces that contribute to the historical articulation of the liberal individual singulatim. In addition to the work of Pred, I consider here the press histories written by Harold Innis toward the end of his life.

Though Innis is sometimes mistaken for a technological determinist, his history of the American press reveals, on the contrary, a careful consideration of the social and political processes which governed the emergence of new communication technologies and their deliberate integration into new and existing monopolies of knowledge.

Instead, it should be understood in contrast to the prevailing views of his peers, who understood communication through the paradigms of domination and therapy. Watson, vice-president of the J. Specifically, Pred identifies three essential functions of the nineteenth century newspaper: advertising, shipping intelligence, and commercial statistics. It is difficult here to overstate the emphasis Foucault places on the emergence of statistics as a central tool of governmentality.

Newspapers, then, were crucial to the construction of economic space as a territorial strategy of police by organizing the social and economic activities of mercantilist commerce. Notably, the Postal Act would generalize and extend these police functions of newspapers to an expanding western frontier through heavy subsidization of newspaper transportation through the American post office.

Figure 1: Population accessibility c The Postal Act of facilitated the dominance of the Eastern Corridor over the American hinterlands, and enabled an unprecedented strategy for governing populations and enabling commerce through the production of spaces of standardized circulation.

Pred Pred maps the development of these spatial biases through a series of time-lag and population-accessibility maps from the s to the s [figs. Those on the receiving end of material from a mechanized central system are precluded from participation in healthy, vigorous, and vital discussion. Instability of public opinion which follows the introduction of new inventions in communication designed to reach large numbers of people is exploited by those in control of inventions.

As one American novelist put it, E Unibus Pluram: from one, many A high estimation indeed. More significant, however, was the ascendency of advertising as the primary source of revenue for the newspaper industry. Driven by the economic imperative to assemble the largest readerships possible — larger audiences commanded a higher price when sold to advertisers — newspapers, freed from the necessity of relying on subsidized newspaper exchanges, abandoned the party patronage model of the political press in an attempt to reach a mass and general audience.

A commercial, advertising-based press therefore saw its advantage in a break with the short-lived era of muck-raking journalism in the late nineteenth century, and a move toward sensational and human-interest stories took place. The rise of large-scale political advertising was also accompanied by declining coverage of political activity, necessitating that candidates for office pay handsomely to advertise their campaigns.

Personal journalism began to decline and more important sources of revenue developed with advertising and department stores… The advertising manager began to absorb responsibility, operations were controlled by the business department, and the publisher became more important. Both demand for news during the Civil War and the expansion of western newspapers precipitated the development of the Western Associated Press, challenging the emerging monopoly of the eastern-based Associated Press.

The Associated Press responded by strengthening its connections with European news agencies and by exploiting its proximity to New York financial news. Newspapers left outside this emerging monopoly formed the United Press, until the disclosure in that the Associated press, though ostensibly a competitor, had held a controlling interest in the company.

At the turn of the twentieth century, however, the monopoly of the Associated Press was again challenged by the emerging Hearst and Scripps-Howard newspaper empires. We are here to sell advertising and sell it at a rate profitable to those who buy it. The history of the American press in the nineteenth century can therefore be understood as a transformation of the political economic base upon which the circulation of newspapers rested, one that began with what I have identified as a police strategy of the US Post Office to facilitate commerce and territorial expansion, before transforming to a market-based system in which larger circulations were subsidized by advertisers eager to access the publics this circulation brought into existence.

On the contrary, Williams , 56 argues that, as a matter of general theory it is useful to recognize that means of communication are themselves means of production. It is true that means of communication, from the simplest physical forms of language to the most advanced forms of communications technology, are themselves always socially and materially produced, and of course reproduced. Yet they are not only forms but means of production… Moreover the means of communication, both as produced and as means of production, are directly subject to historical development.

Crucially, this police function was gradually subsumed by market relationships, as the primary subsidy to circulation changed from a state-run system of postal exchanges to one based on the commodification of audiences through advertising. I have argued that the production of the audience as an object of political strategy — as a strategy of policing populations — can be understood as a crucial form of social production attached to the historical development of the means of communication in the nineteenth century United States.

This complicates what Williams identifies as the liberal analytical bias of privileging media consumption over other aspects of communication, especially those concerning the history of the audience. In the next section I follow Williams to an exploration of the political economic basis of the audience in a capitalist system of communication. In the next section I consider the production of the individual through the lens of time-geography to show how nineteenth century time-space discipline produced and standardized domestic spaces.

I argue that these spaces helped put free time to work by transforming reading and listening into activities which could be commodified and sold to advertisers. The prime purpose of the mass media complex is to produce people in audiences who work at learning the theory and practice of consumership for civilian goods and who support with taxes and votes the military demand management system.

Though Smythe was productively challenged on several fronts, his central thesis — that audiences are produced in commodity form and sold to advertisers — remains a general maxim in the field. For Smythe , 3 , watching, reading, and listening were forms of work performed by audiences. Thus Smythe argues that the materialist answer to the question — 'what is the commodity form of mass-produced, advertiser-supported communications under monopoly capitalism?

Of the off-the-job work time, the largest single block is time of the audiences which is sold to advertisers. Now the principal aspect of capitalist production has become the alienation of workers from the means of producing and reproducing themselves ibid. If the audience commodity thesis contains a theory of mass mediated social reproduction, it also assumes categorically active audiences.

Over-emphasis on the agency of audiences risks falling into the bourgeois trap identified by Raymond Williams, i. To theorize individuals as always succeeding in resisting the dominant readings intended by the makers of popular culture implies a denial of the limits of politics and suggests superhuman abilities, as if people never faltered or tired. Time is the only property possessed, it is bought for work or it is taken for violation.

The strict model was no doubt suggested by the monastic communities. It soon spread. Its three great methods — establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, regulate the cycles of repetition — were soon to be found in schools, workshops and hospitals. The new disciplines had no difficulty in taking up their place in the old forms; the schools and poor-houses extended the life and the regularity of the monastic communities to which they were often attached.

The rigours of the industrial period long retained a religious air; in the seventeenth century, the regulations of the great manufactories laid down the exercises that would divide up the working day. For Innis , , the printing press and the book undermined the "monopoly of monasticism" on knowledge, which in turn was challenged by the emergence of periodicals and newspapers, beginning roughly at the time of the American War of Independence. The Western community was atomized by the pulverizing effects of the application of machine industry to communication.

We have passed from a form of injunction that measured or punctuated gestures to a web that constrains them or sustains them throughout their entire succession. A sort of anatomo-chronological schema of behaviour is defined… Time penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power. I argue therefore that nineteenth century mass industrialization and mass communication combine to effect transformations in the spaces of social reproduction that render them strategic objects of police.

Here the synthetic power of a time-geographic perspective appears among its primary virtues. Echoing Raymond Williams, Pred , 12 includes media exposure as a crucial element in coordinating both path and project development at various spatial scales: Insofar as individuals who live in the same area have a common class or socioeconomic background and belong to the same generation are apt to have amassed numerous similar or common path elements, the uniquely emerging consciousness of many or most of them may contain strong ideological resemblances and a shared "structure of feeling", or sense of belonging to the particular social formation in which they find themselves [Williams].

That is, through participation in some of the same types of projects, through media exposure to and discussion of some of the same political-historical occurrences, celebrities, 50 and popular culture events, and through project-based contact with or exposure to manufactured objects of the same brand, the symbolic systems belonging to the consciousness of such individuals may be capable of evoking many similar associations.

Like Smythe, Pred includes both media exposure and branded commodities as sites of ideological production linked to everyday processes of social reproduction. The time-geographic decoupling of family, Pred argues, helped solidify the individual as an independent economic unit. If liberal thought is usually inclined to conceive the individual as a 51 site of discovery, like Foucault, Pred identifies structures of power beneath the liberal gloss — not discovery, but loss: Inasmuch as factory and large-scale shop workers were reduced to interchangeable role holders confined to the disciplined execution of specialized tasks, individuals began to develop the need to be valued for themselves since individual identity could no longer be realized through work or through the ownership of productive property… Ironically, this contention is consistent with the romantic assumption… that the individual could find meaning and satisfaction in his life at home and nowhere else ibid.

Alienation from the means of production, then, did not confine itself to the shop floor. This new concept of free time is important for thinking together communication and police as a process of enclosing time. A major consequence of this time-geographic rupture was the generalization of a time-space opportunity cost to participate in nonproductive, and, significantly, political projects.

This is to say that the space-time opportunity cost of factory life constituted a novel form of power exerted over the worker. If in the previous section I argued that nineteenth century time-space compression produced new uneven spaces of pastoral power, the standardization of working-class leisure time-spaces identified in Fig.

In this light, dislocation of the habitus can be better understood in terms of spatial convergence of the pastoral scales with which I have been concerned. It is this permeability of time and space to capital, and the corollary pastoral structure of audience commodification that gives modern capitalist communication systems their distinctive character.

As Innis notes, this process of specification was sped by the emergence of magazines in the early twentieth century, many of which sought to access the valuable female readerships to whom the tasks of household consumption fell. As Innis , 7 writes, the position of women as purchasers of goods led to concentration on women's magazines and on advertising…Through the national magazine, advertisers such as the manufacturers of pianos, high cost two-wheeled bicycles, and other commodities were able to reach a large market at less cost than through the daily newspaper and to concentrate on more attractive layouts appealing to people in higher income brackets.

The national magazine made a systematic attack on older advertising media…The average circulations of magazines increased from , to 1,, in the period from to and following the boom beginning in reached 3,, by After the First World War, women's magazines, which had begun as pattern makers in the Delineator and other Butterick papers, gained conspicuously in circulation. Women's magazines reached the largest circulations, paid most highly for articles, and were the chief market for writers.

With the rise of television — the medium of audience commodification par excellence — the specification of individuals undergoes a round of intense refinement. In her contribution to the blindspot debate in the political economy of communication, Eileen Meehan identifies the ratings industry as a crucial intermediary in the process of audience commodification.

Meehan pays particular attention to the way in which the ratings industry specifies, refines, and unevenly values audience 56 demographics along the lines of gender, race, age, income, subculture, etc. Gandy, like Meehan, pays particular attention to the way in which different audiences command different prices on the audience commodity market. The lines of communication belong to this whole; they form the connection between the army and its base, and are to be considered as so many great vital arteries.

Central to the shift in the military line of communication in the nineteenth century was the new possibility of experiencing war at a distance Favret , particularly after the advent of the telegraph, which compressed the time-space of war reporting and allowed for the regular production and consumption of war reporting in metropolitan centers like London or Paris.

He might have added that it was first and foremost a mass of spectators consuming war. Spectatorship did not always mean distance, however, and for many the experience of war was all too immediate. In addition to the radical transformations which have occurred in the mediation of modern warfare, it is also necessary to consider continuities between nineteenth and twentieth century lines of communication.

To the extent that lines of communication were a problem for military commanders, they were a political problem. I reproduce the passage here, with commentary below: an army in an enemy's country… can as a rule only look upon those roads as lines of communication upon which it has advanced; and hence arises through small and almost invisible causes a great difference in operating.

The army in the enemy's country takes under its protection the organisation which, as it advances, it necessarily introduces to form its lines of communication; and in general, inasmuch as terror, and the presence of an enemy's army in the country invests these measures in the eyes of the inhabitants with all the weight of unalterable necessity, the inhabitants may even be brought to regard them as an alleviation of the evils inseparable from war.

Small garrisons left behind in different places support and maintain this system. But if these commissaries, commandants of stations, police, fieldposts, and the rest of the apparatus of administration, were sent to some distant road upon which the army had not been seen, the inhabitants then would look upon such measures as a burden which they would gladly get rid of, and if the most complete defeats and catastrophes had not previously spread terror throughout the land, the probability is that these functionaries would be treated as enemies, and driven away with very rough usage.

Therefore, in the first place it would be necessary to establish garrisons to subjugate the new line, and these garrisons would require to be of more than ordinary 60 strength, and still there would always be a danger of the inhabitants rising and attempting to overpower them.

In short, an army marching into an enemy's country is destitute of the mechanism through which obedience is rendered; it has to institute its officials into their places, which can only be done by a strong hand, and this cannot be effected thoroughly without sacrifices and difficulties, nor is it the work of a moment—From this it follows that a change of the system of communication is much less easy of accomplishment in an enemy's country than in our own, where it is at least possible; and it also follows that the army is more restricted in its movements, and must be much more sensitive about any demonstrations against its communications all emphasis mine.

From this long passage can be observed several important themes which remain relevant for understanding modern lines of communication at war. First, the line of communication appears as a relational space, produced only through the subjugation of the civilian populations through which it runs. As I show, central to the construction of psychological warfare has been the claim that technocratic mastery over public opinion and the means of communication allows for the subjugation of lines of communication across undifferentiated space.

Taken together, these points represent enduring aspects of the line of communication: its relationality with respect to the subjugation of civilian populations, the differential geographical prospects for subjugation at home and abroad, and the enduring role of terror as a tool for subjugating enemy populations. I emphasize these points as they run counter to what becomes the received theory and doctrine of psychological warfare, namely that psychological warfare is an alternative to violence, and that psychological warfare can be effectively waged in enemy countries.

As we were cautiously and slowly approaching the coast, during the previous night, we could see the flashing of the guns around Sebastopol: and occasionally we heard the booming of the heavier pieces of artillery. As Friedberg notes, by the mid nineteenth century the panorama in particular had become a popular European attraction in which the walls of cylindrical buildings were painted to effect an illusion of perspective, reproducing famous landscapes of cities and historical events.

Though in Russian artist Franz Roubaud would produce the famous Siege of Sevastopol panorama, during the war itself smaller panoramic depictions of the war populated the pages of the press, as in the London Illustrated News [Fig. The panoramic view situated the viewer at the centre of the war, producing a paradoxical sense of remove and intimacy in which war become something to be experienced and consumed by civilians at a distance.

London Illustrated News, Dec. While the panorama installation allowed for a construction of a virtual mobility — of bringing an immersive visual representation of London or Venice to far flung locales — the newspaper panorama achieved an even more mobile virtual mobility paradoxically tied to the immobility of the spectator who, as discussed in the previous section, experienced the constricting time-space discipline of nineteenth century everyday industrial life.

Thus the dislocation of the habitus effected by telegraphic time-space 66 compression was again accompanied by a pastoral spatial convergence in which newspaper circulation standardized spaces of news consumption omnes while intervening in the dislocated space of the home singulatim. The spatial fixity of the reader found its counterpart in the spatial expanse of telegraphic war reporting. Despite the ultimate victory, the Crimean War had been a publicity disaster for the British government.

William Howard Russell, sometimes considered the first modern war correspondent Knightley , wrote dispatches to The Times that were highly critical of the aristocratic British officer class, who in comparison to their relatively professionalized French counterparts, were portrayed as ham-fisted and blundering. As British officers faced severe criticism from a war-reading public, managing public opinion became increasingly important to the prosecution of war itself.

Thus, the way in which the public experienced war increasingly became part of war itself. Significantly, the ideology of psychological warfare transforms the vicarious and risible muscular Christianity satirized by Punch into a kind of real war in which the spectator becomes participant by virtue of their pastoral relationship to public opinion. In contrast and response to elite framing of public opinion as a libidinal mob, First World War propaganda reproduced themes of muscular Christianity in which war and war spectatorship was understood to have ennobling effects upon the individual.

Though it raised controversy for 71 depicting the deaths of soldiers, the British propaganda film The Battle of the Somme also provided a model for a muscular Christian interpretation of the war. Is it a sacrilege? If our spirit be purged of curiosity and purified with awe the sight is hallowed. There is no sacrilege if we are fit for the seeing. And I think the seeing ennobled and exalted us. There was a religious reverence in the silence closing over the sobs … I say it is regenerative and resurrective for us to see war stripped bare.

Heaven knows that we need the supreme katharsis, the ultimate cleansing. For Douglas, the decisive factor is not the film, but the watching. See Gregory 72 as part of the increasingly decisive public omnes whose consent becomes necessary for waging war. As I argue in the following chapters, this belief that the libidinal mob can be transformed into a governable pastorate and made productive through the spiritual struggle of its individual members becomes central to the political imaginary of psychological warfare in the 20th century.

After the First World War, however, the promised war sublime gave way to public revulsion not only toward the horrors of the war, but over the extent to which propaganda was used by governments to excite and innervate their own populations.

At question was not only the emergent culture of de-bunking which eroded public trust in government, but also a reactionary stance from those governments concerning the purported problem of the gullibility — and soon vulnerability — of mass publics to propaganda. Writing out of the University of Chicago, Lasswell outlined an early neoconservatism which understood democracy as dangerous, unstable, and in need of elite management.

While American conservatives had been less reticent in their support of elite rule, it was the liberal democrat who turned against mass populism. As long as the democrats were in opposition, they were free to belabour the fact of an infallible though almighty king with the fantasy of an all-wise public. Enthrone the public and dethrone the king! Pass the scepter to the wise […] Familiarity with the ruling public has bred contempt.

Modern reflections upon democracy boil down to the position, more or less contritely expressed, that the democrats were deceiving themselves. The public has not reigned with benignity and restraint. The good life is not in the mighty rushing wind of public sentiment. It is no organic secretion of the horde, but the tedious achievement of the few. The lover of the good life no longer consults Sir Oracle; he pulls the strings of Punch and Judy.

Thus argues the despondent democrat. Let us, therefore, reason together, brethren, he sighs, and find the good, and when we have found it, let us find out how to make up the public mind to accept it. Inform, cajole, bamboozle and seduce in the name of the public good. Preserve the majority convention, but dictate to the majority! The evils of democracy were thereby located not in the duplicity of government deception, but in the credulity of the masses toward it.

Thus did a technocratic elite charge itself with containing the very immoderation and irrationality it had so studiously unleashed during the war. While the securitization of populations is linked to the history of pacification, the idea that mass industrial democracy could be made internally secure through elite management of public opinion was a 75 product of the interwar years. The Civilian mind is standardized by news and not by drills.

While the first major American advertising agency is generally thought to belong to Volney B. Palmer in Philadelphia in the early s, it was the J. There Lasswell analysed the propaganda strategies of German broadcasts and print media, producing research which would become foundational to the field of communication studies in the United States Simpson On the contrary, ironist Lasswell identified the uses and abuses of rationality as attaching primarily to the sentimentality of the liberal upper and middle classes to which individuals like Wells belonged.

Though not particularly sympathetic to the working classes, Lasswell seems to enjoy deconstructing the conceits of liberal ideology and its hostility toward class analysis. Lasswell , 47 sarcastically observed that the war must not be due to a world system of conducting international affairs, nor to the stupidity or malevolence of all governing classes, but to the rapacity of the enemy.

Guilt and guiltlessness must be assessed geographically, and all the guilt must be on the other side of the frontier. If the propagandist is to mobilize the hate of the people, he must see to it that everything is circulated which establishes the sole responsibility of the enemy. By the Second World War, the issue of class had almost entirely been smuggled out of psychological warfare, even in its planning and internal discussions.

Indeed, hostility toward class analysis, and a refusal to understand the class dimensions of warfare became serious obstacles to effective psychological warfare in the Cold War period and beyond. I have argued that the establishment of the press can be understood as form of pastoral power that links together, through spaces of circulation, the governmental scales of population and individual that Foucault argued has been central to the historical development of liberalism.

Paradoxically, this new sense of mobility — enabled by the mediated construction of spaces of in visibility — was predicated upon the relative spatial fixity of the individual whose progressive alienation from their labour drove them to seek new satisfactions in private life and a leisure time increasingly given over to exploitation through the economically productive activity of audience work. Finally, I have argued that the experience of massive government propaganda efforts during the First World War helped to produce in the interwar years both public outrage and a reactionary push by liberal elites to frame public credulity as a kind of vulnerability and insecurity at the very root of modern democratic government.

While I attempt to trace the first-order history of American psychological warfare and its attempt to construct pastoral spaces of communication, this dissertation also traces the second-order history of psychological warfare as a rhetorical technique and a geopolitical imagination. Ironically, the second-order history of psychological warfare often attempts to obscure the first, offering ideological analyses of the power of the press in place of the material.

As discussed above, I take seriously the Clausewitzean identification of the line of communication as a relational space defined by its human contours. In chapter 3, I argue that psychological warfare first existed as a second-order geopolitical imagination irrigating and altering domestic lines of American communication.

In chapter 4, conversely, I show how psychological warfare only later assumed its first-order meaning in strategies to target and administer foreign populations at war. In chapters 5 and 6, I reproduce this structure to trace the historical and geographical development of domestic and foreign lines of American communication during the Cold War.

The Birth of Psychological Warfare Propaganda was often talked about as though it were a magical force emancipated from the limitations of time, place, and figure… We know that propagandists are socialized in bodies politics whose specific contextual features set limits on potential perception, imagination, and behavior, and that propagandists seek to influence audiences whose socialization is similarly circumscribed.

I detail the work of a concerted group of American interventionists in government, media and the academy who framed German psychological warfare as a new and unprecedented threat purporting to alter the geography of war and challenge the viability of popular American isolationism. Though American psychologists worked to articulate the threat, the construction of psychological warfare was nevertheless most directly tied to the spectre of German geopolitics.

An episode on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack illustrates the fevered pitch that pronouncements on psychological warfare had taken by the end of It was in his capacity as 27 Founded in at Johns Hopkins University under contract with the US Army, the Operations Research Office ORO was among the first instances centers to refine the field of operations research, which relied heavily on mathematical modeling of and applying principles of scientific management to military operations.

See Farish , On the contrary, it will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice. I reveal, moreover, that the construction of psychological warfare as a strategy to coax reticent Americans into the war represents an important and formative moment in US-UK intelligence relations, Aldrich ; Dittmer Together, Donovan and the BSC leveraged contacts in the academy, radio, and press in support of several well-connected interventionist organizations, including the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, the Council for Democracy, and the Fight for Freedom Committee.

See Troy for an fuller account. Jackson, who would go on to occupy top posts in the new field of psychological war first at the OSS and later in the Eisenhower administration see below. See also Trudel Despite the Sturm und Drang, there was scarce evidence of a German fifth column in the United States. It was nonetheless a useful political expedient for branding isolationists as agents and dupes of German propaganda.

Isolationists rallied around the America First committee, which was founded in and drew an incongruous constituency from anti-war activists and communists to nativist fascists and pro-business conservatives MacDonald Celebrity aviator and white supremacist Charles Lindbergh was its highest profile spokesman, though other members included Gerald Ford and John F.

Recriminations between isolationists and interventionists intensified in the wake of the March Lend-Lease debates, which drastically increased American material support to the Allies. One interventionist committee — Friends of Democracy, Inc.

It was not a baseless accusation. Upon their return from England, Mowrer fanned the flames of fifth column alarmism in a series of widely-published editorials which were also republished as the pamphlet Fifth Column Lessons for America. A map [Fig. The locations presumably corresponded to the hundreds of unions, organizations, and obscure clubs listed on the reverse side, many linked to Germany, Italy, and Eastern Europe, as well as to black American political organizations.

A tabloid newspaper Beware the Fifth Column similarly prescribed self-defence through geopolitical knowledge, reproducing a map from the New York Daily Mirror [Fig. As Heffernan argues, spy stories reached a crescendo of collective hysteria after , with the more popular newspapers cynically abusing public anxiety to boost circulation figures.

Lord Northcliffe's Daily Mail carried dozens of articles… emphasising the weakness of Britain's defences against enemy agents who were apparently operating at will amongst an unsuspecting British public, sketching coastlines and fortifications, perusing Ordnance Survey maps, and secretly preparing for invasion. Though no such institute existed, the American press amplified both claims, portraying German geopolitics as a 97 science for waging war, and psychology as a new weaponized field for propagandists.

One prominent example was his Conversations with Hitler, which is now widely believed to have been fabricated. The enemy people must be demoralized and ready to capitulate, before military action can even be thought of… Mental confusion, indecisiveness, panic, these are our weapons. Significantly, Mowrer and Donovan framed the threat of fifth columnism as specific to democratic government. The US edition was ominously titled Voices of Destruction. However, the logic was clear: race and class struggles supported German psychological warfare objectives and could therefore could be understood not in terms of civil democracy, but in terms of war.

This transformation of the democratic motive from connotations of problematical actuality to connotations of futurity also fits well with the logic of the military motive, which requires great modifications of democracy as an actuality but can retain democracy "substantially" by making these modifications in the name of democracy as a purpose. And the disfranchised, such as the natives of India or the Negroes of the South, can logically be asked to defend democracy as a purpose — even when they could not be asked to defend it as an actuality.

The logic was the culmination of the liberal panic over the vulnerability and manipulability of the public in the inter-war years Ch. Indeed, the geographical deracination of psychological warfare was fundamental to the threat that it could take hold anywhere.

It seems mysterious. The immensity of this sum is the secret p. Though it is difficult to ascertain the exact nature of the collaboration, Taylor was an asset of the British Security Coordination Mahl , which leveraged contacts in the American press — with the support of Donovan and President Roosevelt — to disseminate unattributed interventionist propaganda to the American public.

Though largely forgotten, more than any other individual Edmond Taylor advanced claims concerning the existence and nature of psychological warfare that supported the interventionist position that the United States was under attack from an unseen German plot to control the minds of the American people. Like bombing, I argue that the moral economy of psychological warfare revolves around the claims that it is objective, that it is manly, that it saves lives, and that it is law-ful.

Central to the early construction of German psychological warfare was the claim that it was objective — not only a new and intractable reality of modern war, but guided by scientific expertise. See Lemov and Melley Second, it distanced psychological warfare from the propaganda of the First World War which two decades of inter-war debunking had shown to have been primarily a matter of duplicity and deception by the governing classes. Against my analysis of the rootedness of the power of the press in the pastoral time-spaces of information circulation and audience commodification, psychological warfare rhetorically dislocated power from these spaces, posing psychological warfare not as a material problem open to political redress, but as an esoteric and technical problem of the human mind.

In their insistence upon the psychological and therefore the individuated, Taylor and his colleagues at the Office of the Coordinator of Information advanced an idealist theory of communication. Through shortwave broadcast, radio signals could be carried across oceans, and in theory an American listenership for German programming could be developed. Broadcasts attempted to counter interventionist claims, and to assure Americans that Germany had no military designs on the United States.

It was perhaps for good reason, however, that alarmists like Taylor and Donovan eschewed material analysis of German psychological warfare. Gillars served twelve years in the United States, while Joyce was hanged in England in , making him the last person executed for treason in the United Kingdom. What sympathies with Germany did exist in the United States adhered to extant American anti-Semitism and white supremacy, like that of America First luminary Charles Lindberg, or to the conservative business class, like Henry Ford, Prescott Bush, and other American industrialists who advocated for a right-wing military strongman in the United States see Denton The rhetorical importance of short wave radio as the premiere medium of German psychological warfare was therefore belied by the actually existing constitution of its listenership.

As a relational space of government and a line of communication, German shortwave radio in the United States was a failure. More successful, however, were the efforts of American interventionists to leverage their own well-established lines of communication to the American public to saturate the press with dire warnings concerning the corrosive effect of German psychological warfare on American minds.

In this way, the early American intelligence community was able to construct a new geographical imagination surrounding psychological warfare, based on the perceived compression of time and space achieved by shortwave radio.

Furthermore, interventionist rhetoric sought to dislocate the power of propaganda from the uneven spaces of its circulation and reception to construct a geographical imagination of psychological warfare that operated across space rendered undifferentiated by geopolitical intelligence and expertise.

As I have suggested, this rhetorical construction sought to fabricate the experiential dislocation of time-space compression by constructing a geographical imaginary of invisible psychological invasion. Shortwave radio had formally collapsed the friction of distance, but its lack of an effective listenership belied the fact that it did not represent a revolution of the objective qualities of space and time.

Fear of propaganda corresponded in fact more to the debunking culture of the interwar years, and public outrage against both war and war propaganda. Insofar as propaganda did represent am objective dislocation of the habitus, it was pursuant to what I have identified in the previous chapter as the historical development of the press as strategy of pastoral power, culminating in the mass propaganda campaigns of the First World War. As suggested, the rhetorical scientism of psychological warfare qua psychology served to obscure the material basis of this power, distancing it from the non-technical problem of political duplicity, and locating it within the opaque esoterica of psychological science.

As Harvey suggests, the foreboding generated out of the sense of social space imploding in upon us forcibly marked by everything from the daily news to random acts of international terror or global environmental problems translates into a crisis of identity. If fifth column alarmism articulated the idea of internal threats from abroad, psychological warfare went further still to pose its target as the individual as such.

As I have argued, these geographical imaginations emphasized the vulnerability of both the American public and individuals to psychological invasion thereby attempting to obviate the very possibility of isolationism in public discourse. This argument proceeded apace with the moral economy of bombing, which insisted that aerial bombardment could save lives by speeding Allied victory, shortening war, and preventing battle causalities that would otherwise have taken place.

As discussed below, American interventionists played for full value the interwar German literature which, as a face-saving maneuver for a re-militarizing nation, blamed Allied propaganda for their military losses. Department of the Army Psychological Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Field Manual No. Washington, DC. As Gregory suggests, lawfulness here means not only legality but also a broader claim concerning the production of social order.

Most existing accounts are internal critiques of the field interested in tracing the trajectory of psychology through and after the war Hoffman ; Johnson ; Finison , ; Neiburg ; Faye , and do not account for the external political forces which propelled psychological warfare into existence.

These accounts nonetheless help situate and understand the way in which the field of psychology was drawn into the larger construction of psychological warfare, before and after Rather, important forces and influential figures outside the profession dictated the formulation of the problem as a problem.

From these groups, psychologists soon organized the Psychologists League which advocated for the employment of psychologists, especially by government. Though the SPSSI and the Psychologists League shared many goals — most prominently the employment of psychologists — differences consisted in the fact that Psychologists League members were, by and large, clinicians and communists, while the SPSSI were an academic coalition of social democrats and liberals primarily interested in influencing and improving their position within the APA.

It was fitting, then, that the first major publication of the SPSSI was a yearbook on Industrial Conflict, which roused conflicting opinions among its membership on the proper place of social science in politics. It is in the context of these organizations and conflicts that the spectre of psychological warfare descended upon the American psychological community. Its members were not, however, totally unprepared. In , the APA formed an Emergency Committee to organize psychologists for the possibility of American entry into the war.

When morale was discussed, it was understood as soldier morale; as the psychological problems attached to the performance of soldiers in battle. By , however, the issue of civilian morale had become a topic of widespread public discussion. The psychological community, eager for the coming war work, organized another Emergency Committee in August of under the Division of Anthropology and Psychology of the National Research Council Dallenbach, Nothing was said concerning how war and war propaganda could be analyzed; it was simply and enthusiastically believed that psychologists were capable of doing this.

It is to be hoped that psychologists will seize the opportunity to extend and apply our understanding of these and other problems that have been reviewed here. As summated by the field communist and clinical wing in a Psychologists League Journal editorial, Morale is a means to an end.

What end? And will the methods employed gain morale only to lose its goal? Would psychologists persuade people to sacrifice and endure against their fundamental and ultimate interests? Would they seek to maintain self-defeating morale in which living standards are propelled downward, civil rights abrogated, labor coordinated, minorities persecuted? The Committee served as a recruiting ground for the nascent American intelligence community, with many of its members going on to work for the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of War Information.

See also Schiller Its editor Ladislas Farago was a journalist with a flair for sensationalism, hyperbole, and outright fabrication. In July , however, as editor of German Psychological Warfare, Farago had the full support of the nascent American intelligence community comprising the membership of the Committee for National Morale. Before this contradiction can be regarded as a basic weakness and danger of the whole German morale policy, it must be remembered that the two approaches are applied in a parallel rather than conflicting manner, providing alternate solutions for solving specific problems.

This emphasis on the individual, however, was mediated through the paradoxical scale of the pastorate to an idea of psychologically warring populations. While the pastoral logic of psychological warfare claimed to target both the omnes et singulatim citizen and citizenry, it remained curiously aspatial, even as it attempted to construct a for itself a geographical imaginary.

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